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IV
LEGAL MEANING AND 'INSTITUTIONAL FA C T S ’
IV .l Legal Meaning
It is both curious and paradoxical, though in the light o f the preceding analysis we 
may perhaps immodestly assert that it is by no means inexplicable, that when an 
individual engages in a course of action which is subjectively m eaningful to him by 
reference to whatever criteria of meaning he applies to his action (w hether consciously 
or unconsciously) the action in question may, from  the point o f view o f someone else, 
sim ultaneously bear a normative meaning by reference to d ifferen t criteria  o f meaning, 
specifically, legal norms, and it may well be that the acting individual is wholly 
oblivious o f these other meanings, or indeed any other norm ative m eaning, which the 
action in question may reasonably bear.
It was to the possibility of this divergence between subjectively intended m eaning and 
legal meaning that Neil MacCormick, though not in precisely those term s, drew  our 
attention in 1973 in his inaugural lecture to the U niversity of E dinburgh w hen he said:
"...for every busload of passengers, there exist, in addition to the solid, physical 
bus and the stolid, palpable, passengers, as many contracts o f carriage as there 
are passengers. The existence o f a contract between each passenger and 
Edinburgh Corporation is obviously not a m atter o f physical or physiological 
fact, nor even indeed of psychological fact. Possibly some people on any bus 
know or believe that they have made a contract on entering and paying their 
fare to the driver; almost certainly some do not know it; and quite plausibly on 
some buses nobody at all knows or believes it. But the knowledge or opinion of 
particular passengers and drivers is totally imm aterial to the proposition that 
there exist as many contracts as passengers." 1
But the point that MacCormick was making here is rather more fundam ental than the
2assertion that the ’typical’ (and perhaps, though not ipso facto , legally uninform ed) 
m an -in -the-s tree t’s interpretation o f certain ’contract-institu ting’ acts or events may 
diverge from  the ’typical’ (and hopefully ipso facto  legally inform ed) lawyer’s 
interpretation o f the same events by reference to legal criteria o f meaning, that is, 
legal norms which are considered to be in some sense ’applicable’ to the events in 
question. It is well recognised that this is only the approach road to M acCorm ick’s 
theory o f law as institutional fact. But it is on that approach road that several insights 
surface which, it will hopefully be affirm ed, resonate w ith observations made in the 
preceding analysis. We will briefly consider these before giving closer attention to 
M acCormick’s institutional theory of law.
The first o f MacCormick’s observations requires very little supplem entary comm ent if  
only because it is, in a sense, the raison d ’etre o f the present analysis. It is that the 
individual who knows the law, which presum ably includes any such individual who is 
sufficiently  interested or motivated to do this, is "...concerned to perceive the 
relationship  between bus operator and bus passenger in legal terms". 2 This is a 
reaffirm ation o f the relationality which, as we have noted earlier, generally inheres in 
the subjective meaning of social action, but in a focused and articulated form  in legal 
thinking. Through this, an ideative linkage may be conceived between legal personae 
by reference to normative criteria which together with other criteria  constitute a 
linking medium. Such linking media may include: (1) certain perceived facts 
consisting wholly or partly o f hum an action or wholly or partly o f ’natural 
occurrences’ or other events attributed to hum an action, or even wholly or partly  o f 
other states o f affairs or states of fact (e.g. ’status’ conditions, or the holding o f a 
position), and (2) legal norms ’applied’ to those facts.
3The second observation is that a ’contract instituting’ act or event such as that 
exemplified by the M orningside omnibus scenario is significant especially to lawyers, 
though no doubt also to sociologists o f law, because, crucially, "...the law ascribes 
certain rights and duties to individuals conditionally upon the existence o f contracts." 3 
But who does this ascribing? If  ’ascribing* is the conceptual act of an individual, the 
suggestion is clear that if  it is ’the law’ that ’ascribes’, then even in a figurative sense 
’the law* must either be equated w ith an individual or, probably more accurately (but 
still figuratively) be identified  with an individual whether determ inate or 
indeterm inate. Odd as this argum ent may seem, there must be some underlying tru th  
in it even though in a figurative sense it is undoubtedly stretching, if not distorting, 
the idea o f law to equate or identify law with one or more persons. We m ight then 
plausibly expect a serious answer to the question ’who is the law?* and should not be 
too disappointed if  we find that the question is not accorded the seriousness which 
underlies our reason for asking it.
But how do we account for the fact that we are accustomed to talking about legal 
phenomena as i f  the law were a person: for example, ’the law imposes liability*, ’the 
law confers a right’, ’the law allows an exem ption’, ’the law creates an im m unity’ and 
so on. It seems reasonable to account for such linguistic usages by acknowledging the 
obvious truth that the law is an uniquely human phenomenon created and organised by 
hum an beings for hum an beings, and it should not therefore surprise us that there is a 
tendency in a sense to anthropomorphise the law.
But these linguistic usages also suggest a more arcane tru th  (if tru th  it is) which 
Glanville Williams uncovers in his essay Language and the Law.
4"For instance, V inogradoff regarded a legal right as a kind o f claim. Now a 
claim is a psychological fact, a state of mind; but legal rights can ’exist’ in 
people who do not know of their existence, and so have not the m ental attitude 
o f claim. ...Rights and duties are mental states, but they are not states o f mind 
of the subjects o f the rights and duties; they are states of m ind o f the persons 
asserting the legal rules." 4
It certainly seems true that rights and duties are indeed states o f m ind o f persons 
asserting legal rules, or ’applying’ the rules to situations o f fact and conceiving o f the 
relative position o f legal personae, respectively of inherence and o f incidence, in 
specifically relational terms.
But against Williams we should note that the subject of a right or a du ty  m ay at one 
and the same time be the person who asserts or ’applies’ the appropriate legal rules. In 
other words, it is more accurate to say that while rights and duties are indeed states of 
mind o f persons asserting or ’applying’ legal rules, those asserting o r ’applying’ the 
rules in question m ight quite plausibly themselves be the subjects o f the rights and 
duties and be fully apprised o f their legal situation. Nevertheless, Williams’ poin t is an 
im portant one. If  law can be treated as i f  it is capable o f ’performing* hum an 
functions (’imposing*, ’conferring’, ’allowing* and so on) and o f being figuratively  
assigned a human identity (or o f corresponding to someone whose ’state o f m ind’, to 
use Williams’ phrase, somehow embodies a legal ’state of m ind’), then it should quite 
credibly be part of the theorist’s task to identify some hum an individual or 
position-occupant who to a culturally significant degree epitomises the individual who 
might conceivably perform  these functions. Such an individual would presum ably, 
according to Williams, assert (or ’apply’) the appropriate legal rules.
If  no such person exists as such and we are nevertheless convinced o f the necessity to 
’create’ him , then it certainly makes sense for heuristic purposes to conceive a 
theoretical construct, say in the form  of a Weberian ideal type, w hich represents a 
synthesis o f appropriate concrete phenomena. The need to construct such an ideal
5type has o f course been suggested at several points in the preceding analysis, and is 
specifically attem pted in chapter VI . 5
What Williams, then, fails to point out is that it can matter what the office, status or 
identity  is o f the person who does the asserting or the ascribing (or perform s the other 
functions m entioned), for it may be sociologically more significant that one person, for 
example a judge, rather than another person, fo r example the man on the M orningside 
om nibus, ascribes rights and duties to legal personae.
This fu rth e r point is noted by M acCormick because, as M acCormick says, it matters
that the law ascribes rights and duties because in turn what makes that m atter,
"...is that sometimes people wish to assert legal rights and enforce legal duties,
the procedures for doing which are established by fu rther legal rules. A nd all
that depends on the existence o f organised groups o f people, the legal 
profession, the courts, and enforcem ent officials, whose function is to give 
e ffec t to such rules and whose actual practice is tolerably consonant w ith  the 
announced rules." 6
The basic point MacCormick makes here is that, as it so happens, it is culturally 
significant that certain organised groups o f people orient their social action (’o ffic ia l’ 
action) w ithin a defined sphere o f competence by reference to the m eaning ascribed 
by virtue o f legal norms to certain perceived states o f ’fact,’ and in consequence o f 
which they ascribe rights and duties (for example) to litigants. Crucially, these 
conceptual acts take place with a view to the orientation o f official action.
Now this connects with earlier discussion in which we considered how an individual, 
w ith a view to the orientation of his social action, may ascribe norm ative m eaning to 
his action and as part of this process ascribe m eaning by reference to sim ilar criteria  
of m eaning to the action of others. We may recall that the task o f considering how an
6individual so ascribes meaning to his own and others’ action involves an assum ption 
that in order to understand the action o f actor A in term s o f its subjective meaning we 
must often  understand the meaning which actor A in a given case ascribed to the 
behaviour o f actor B. From this we concluded that since the Weberian sociological 
task attem pts to penetrate the subjective meaning o f the action o f a given individual 
(ego), then if  and to the extent that ego him self ascribes meaning to the action o f 
another individual (alter) and orients his action accordingly, the latter ascription o f 
meaning should be treated as part o f the subjective meaning o f ego’s action. 7
The im plications o f this stance in the legal context should now be obvious. If we wish 
to investigate the action of a given judge  (treated as ’ego’),or, say, to form ulate an 
ideal-type construct of the incum bent o f the ultim ate judicial office with a view to 
understanding the adjudication process, we are probably justified  in assuming that 
such a judge is involved in orienting his official action at least partly by reference to 
the evaluative meaning which he ascribes to perceived states of ’fact’ (e.g. hum an 
action) that are attributable to one or more others (treated as ’alter’). Such m eaning is 
ascribed by reference to legal rules or norms. The construction o f such an ideal type 
may be based on investigations or undisputed assumptions about one or more 
individual judges. This m eaning-ascribing process would o f course involve a judge in 
conceiving o f the normative positions o f litigants in relational terms: that is, in term s 
of what one litigant ought to have done or ought now to do in a question w ith the 
other litigant.
The ascriptive nature of legal rights and duties, by which we mean that certain  
individuals such as occupants of judicial office engage in the conceptual act of 
ascribing ’rights’ and ’duties’, has been affirm ed by jurists other than M acCorm ick,
7such as, for example, the Polish legal philosopher Leon Petrazycki. In his Introduction 
to Petrazycki’s work Law and M orality, Nicholas Tim ascheff rem arks,
"According to Petrazhitsky, the mental phenomena which form  the reality of 
law, such as states o f hum an minds ascribing rights and duties, possess the 
property o f being projected onto the persons and things they concern; this 
property they share with m any other phenomena. In other words, ’real* is the 
mental fact o f ascribing a right or a duty to oneself or another; this ascription 
always depends on the acceptance o f normative judgm ent o f norms. The latter 
are also merely states of m ind but are also projected into reality, in other words, 
ascribed reality." 8
On a more comprehensive view, we m ight argue that the m eaningful orientation of 
judicial action by reference to legal norms -  norms which by reason o f some factual 
criterion o f identification such as source, origin or content 9 are capable o f being 
identified  as such -  follows upon purely mental judgm ental or evaluative acts 
consisting in the ascription by a judge of legal meaning either to:
1. the judge’s past, present or (hypothetical) intended future action by reference to 
adjective  legal norms (in the sense discussed earlier), or
2. the past, present or (hypothetical) anticipated fu ture  action o f one or more 
others by reference to substantive legal norms (in the sense discussed earlier), the 
’others’ in question being, for example, litigants, enforcem ent officials and so 
on, or
3. a combination o f the judge’s past, present or (hypothetical) intended fu ture  
action and the past, present or (hypothetical) anticipated fu tu re  action o f one or 
more others, by reference to a corresponding com bination o f adjective and 
substantive legal norms.
8By this account, the conceptual act of ascribing rights and duties, as envisaged both by 
M acCormick and Petrazycki, falls into category 2 above and also category 3.
Hence, legal meaning as a subjective category may be said to constitute part o f the 
subjective meaning o f any given actor’s social action where the action in question is 
oriented and /o r evaluated by reference to legal norms. But if  the category o f legal 
meaning is to have any heuristic value it must, as we have already argued, be 
considered from  a judicial perspective, especially an ultimate jud ic ia l perspective, 
rather than arbitrarily  from  the point of view of any actor at all. The judgm ents 
’emanating’ from  this ultimate judicial actor, moreover, must be considered both 
’authoritative’ and ’final’. It is w ithout doubt the action o f the ultim ate jud icial social 
actor and the subjective meaning o f that action that especially concern us in the 
present study.
IV. 2 Legal M eaning and the ’Institutional Fact’.
A theorist who may arguably be said to be pivotal between the sociological notion of 
meaning and the notion of meaning in legal theory is the A ustrian legal philosopher 
Hans Kelsen (1881 -  1973). Kelsen actually uses the term  ’legal m eaning’, though not 
necessarily in the sense defined in the present essay, and certainly not in a sociological 
sense since he would doubtless categorically reject a sociological approach.
Despite his espousal o f an avowedly ’ideologically’ neutral pure-norm  epistemological 
position, 10 parts of Kelsen’s work appear to be profoundly m arked by the influence 
of assumptions which are inescapably those o f the Germ an Geisteswissenschaften
9tradition in which, as we earlier considered at length, the individual is perceived as a 
’meaningful actor’ who orients his action by reference to some ideative or mental 
content. It is beyond the scope o f  this thesis to consider the d ifficulties we may 
encounter in reconciling Kelsen’s pure-norm  stance with his evident reliance upon 
some o f the more obvious assumptions o f the Geisteswissenschaften approach, and 
indeed to consider whether these are capable o f reconciliation. Most o f K elsen’s 
observations in this respect are illuminating w hether or not we attem pt such a 
reconciliation.
In his condensed version of The Pure Theory o f  Law , 11 Kelsen comments as follows:
"This is a special characteristic of the m aterial dealt w ith in social and in 
particular in juristic knowledge. A plant can convey nothing about itself to the 
research worker who is trying to define it. It makes no attem pt to explain itself 
scientifically. But a social act can very well carry with it an indication o f its 
own meaning. The person instituting the act himself attaches to it a defin ite  
meaning which he expresses in some fashion or other and which is understood 
by those towards whom the act is directed." 12
The notion that meaning is capable o f attachm ent to human acts both by an actor 
himself and by others towards whom the act is directed, or indeed anyone who is 
concerned to evaluate the act in question, is fashioned by Kelsen into a m ore specific 
conception o f legally  meaningful phenomena, especially ’acts’ or ’events’ or ’facts’, 13 
and also legal norms themselves (i.e. legal deontic propositions), the latter o f which 
are presented by Kelsen as the meaning o f certain  acts o f will: probably law-creating  
’acts of will’. 14 Bernard Jackson draws attention to this am bivalent position, 15 but 
there is no suggestion on Jackson’s part that it is invalid for Kelsen to iden tify  more 
than one sense in which legal meaning may exist.
If  Kelsen conceives of the norm in its role as deontic proposition as a m eaningful
10
expression (in the semiotic sense) o f some mental content embodying the idea o f 
’ought’ in relation to human action then this is surely acceptable provided other senses 
o f ’meaning’, e.g. acts or events bearing a legal meaning, are also explored.
This sense -  that of the norm as a ’scheme of interpretation* -  is o f particular interest 
in the present context and indeed plays a central role in the institutional theory o f law 
developed by Neil MacCormick and by Ota Weinberger. 16 Kelsen gives expression to 
his conception o f the legal norm as a scheme of interpretation at various points in 
d ifferen t texts, but the essence o f K elsen’s conception is conveyed in the following 
passage.
"The specifically legal meaning o f [a legal or illegal act]... is derived from  a 
’norm ’ whose content refers to the act; this norm confers legal meaning to the 
act, so that it may be interpreted according to this norm. The norm functions as 
a scheme of interpretation. ...The qualification o f a certain act as the execution 
o f the death penalty rather than as a m urder - a qualification that cannot be 
perceived by the senses -  results from  a thinking process: from  the confrontation 
o f this act with the criminal code and the code o f crim inal procedure." 17
To summarise the observations made at various points in the preceding discussion, 
’m eaning’ can be said to be present on three levels (at least).
F irst, there is the meaning which the norm  itself bears in its role as deontic 
proposition i.e. a linguistic utterance representing a m eaningful expression o f some 
mental content. In essence, the norm  is the semiotic representation o f this m ental
content. But meaning must also be ascribed to the norm in order that it may be
comprehensible.
Second, there is the meaning o f the norm  in its application to specific, though also
conceivably hypothetical, human acts, or events or ’facts’. 18
11
T hird, there is the corresponding meaning (i.e. ’normative m eaning’) o f the acts, 
events or ’facts’ themselves interpreted by reference to the norm.
Although these three categories o f meaning are interdependent, the th ird  category is 
especially im portant for present purposes since one of our concerns is to reach an 
understanding o f the subjective meaning of hum an action so far as oriented in terms 
o f such meaning.
Legal meaning in this th ird  (Kelsenian) sense, as Jackson points out, is also linked 
w ith institutional meaning in the sense expounded by John Searle in a philosophical 
context, 19 and in a jurisprudential context by MacCormick and W einberger. 
M acCormick gives a definitive statement o f the nature o f the ’institutional fact’ when 
he says:
"...a proposition whose tru th  depends not merely upon the occurrence o f acts or 
events in the world, but also upon the application o f rules to such acts or events, 
is a proposition o f institutional fact. So the existence of a contract is, in a 
philosophical sense, a m atter o f institutional fact." 20
Elsewhere, M acCormick gives an account o f a university faculty sem inar which is an 
’institutional fact’ in the same sense:
"So the fact that we confront in this case is not a pure physical fact, a brute fact 
o f the natural universe. It is a fact o f the kind which results from  the 
interpretation o f hum an acts and other physical and psychological events in the 
light o f a set o f operative human rules and customs. Such facts belong to the 
class o f ’institutional facts’..." 21
What is implied by the concept of the ’institutional fact’ is that the individual is not 
simply a ’recipient* of or one who perceives an accumulation o f unstructured and 
meaningless ’facts’, consisting o f sense perceptions. The thinking individual, rather, 
brings structure to the mass o f sense perceptions which confront him , and to that
12
extent ascribes meaning to the ’facts’ which he perceives. Thus the concept of the 
’institutional fact’ appears to lie within the realm of the Verstehende epistemological 
tradition. That is to say, it lies within a tradition whose philosophical roots, through 
Weber, are to be found in the Geisteswissenschaften approach expounded by Dilthey 
and others. As M acCormick and Weinberger observe in their jo in t introduction to An 
Institutional Theory o f  Law : "There is always an elem ent o f verstehen, o f understanding 
from  the internal point o f view, in our cognition o f institutional facts..." 22
Now without derogating from  MacCormick and W einberger’s position, or for that 
m atter, Kelsen’s, it is im portant to identify precisely what ’facts’ may be 
’institutionalised’, or ascribed normative, specifically legal, m eaning, when they are 
described as ’institutional facts’.
Generally speaking, the ’intervention’ in the adjudicatory sense o f a judge, or of a 
judicial organ o f some kind, whether it be in a dispute-resolving capacity or in a 
declaratory or advisory capacity, is dependent upon the happening o f a complex and 
often discrete accum ulation of human acts or events. Obviously, a judge will not 
intervene unless a num ber of procedural form alities have been complied with. The 
legal action or lawsuit must be at the instance o f some determ inate party , that is, a 
legal persona possessing legal personality, for example, a civil litigant or a prosecutor. 
This party must ’approach’ the judge or the court in a special way by raising an 
’action’ in accordance with legal norms which stipulate (for example) w hether any 
documents require to be lodged or filed with the court prior to the com m encem ent of, 
or during, the action, and if  so, the nature o f these documents. Legal norms o f this 
type normally also define the qualifications of, or other qualifying conditions which 
attach to, those who wish to argue a case before the court.
13
All o f the situations described -  judicial ’in tervention’, the existence o f a dispute or 
the requirem ent for a judicial declarator, the raising o f an action, the existence of 
persons qualified to be a judge or to be heard by a judge, the filing o f documents in a 
court and the act of presenting argum ent to a court and so on -  are situations o f ’fact’, 
and most, if  not all, are ’facts* to which norm ative meaning must be or may be 
ascribed at some stage or another, with a view to the orientation o f someone’s action, 
often, specifically a judge’s or that o f a court official. They are also legal 
’institutional facts’ in the sense described in so fa r  as interpreted by reference to legal 
norms.
O f course, as a m atter o f routine, many situations o f ’fact* can simply be taken for 
granted and it may require very little effort consciously to ascribe norm ative meaning. 
But however ’routine’ the situations of ’fact* may be, the perceiving o f their 
occurrence and their interpretation by reference to whatever criteria  o f m eaning are 
considered appropriate for that purpose, are always a prerequisite to some fu rther 
appropriate action being taken.
In short, something must happen before a norm , legal or otherwise, is considered 
operative for the purpose of being applied towards the interpretation o f ’events* that 
have occurred and for the consequent orientation o f action thereon. (We must 
however always allow for hypothetical situations in which, strictly speaking, nothing 
need ’happen’). The class of situations of ’fac t’ which are prerequisite in the sense 
discussed we might call the class o f ’operative* situations of ’fact’ or ’operative facts’. 
These are ’facts’ which are ’operative’ as a basis fo r the orientation o f hum an social 
action towards a given end, and in a legal context, judicial or o ther official social
14
action, pursuant to, or in accordance w ith, one or more legal norms.
It is well recognised that the term  ’operative fact* is that used by H ohfeld, 28 but 
K ocourek employs a similar concept, that o f the ’ju ral fact’. 24 The sim ilarity betw een 
H ohfeld’s concept of the ’operative fact* and Kocourek’s concept of the ’ju ra l fact* can 
be seen in the definition offered by each theorist respectively.
Thus, according to Hohfeld,
"Operative, constitutive, causal, or dispositive facts are those which, under the 
general legal rules that are applicable, suffice to change legal relations, that is, 
either to create a new relation, or to extinguish an old one, or to perform  both 
o f these functions simultaneously." 25
A ccording to Kocourek,
"In a wide sense, a ju ral relation is a ju ral fact, but the term ju ra l fact has a 
special and narrower meaning. In the strict ju ristic  sense a jura l fa c t is any act 
or event which creates, alters, or extinguishes a ju ra l relation." 26
Thus, any act or event is an ’operative* or a ’ju ra l’ ’fact’ if, on being in terpreted  by 
reference to a legal norm, it affords a basis (to the ’in terpreter’) for the ascription or 
non-ascription of a legal relationship. H ere, the terms ascription and non-ascrip tion 
refer to the perceiving of, or perceiving o f no, relationship between one or more legal 
personae in relation to one or more other legal personae by reference to the linking 
m edium  of a legal norm. The occurrence o f ’operative facts* therefore may a ffo rd  a 
basis fo r asserting, for example, that A has a right in a question with B that B shall 0 
and B has a duty’ in a question with A that B shall 0. Neil M acCormick’s example was 
that o f the bus passenger stepping aboard a bus and carrying out a  conceptually (rather 
than practically) complex sequence o f acts. The result was that a ’contract* existed and 
a m yriad o f actual and hypothetical legal relationships were, in an ideative sense,
15
called into existence. 27 Here the relationships in question are substantive relationships 
in the sense o f the previous discussion.
K ocourek’s defin ition  of ’ju ral fact’ is broader than H ohfeld’s defin ition  of ’operative 
fact’, the la tte r o f which is in effect a ’fact’ which calls into or out o f ’existence’ a 
legal relationship or ju ral relation, that is, a ’fact* which affords a basis fo r such a 
relationship to be, or not to be, ascribed. The breadth o f the concept o f the ’ju ral 
fact’ can be seen in K ocourek’s categorisation o f what he calls ’duty  acts* and 
’con tra-du ty  acts’ as ’jural facts’. He gives as an example o f a ’duty act* the tender of 
paym ent o f money due, and o f a ’contra-duty  act’, a crim inal act. 28 A ’duty  act* 
cannot be treated  as an ’operative fact’ in the H ohfeldian sense because if  an 
’operative fact* is a ’fact’ or situation of ’fact’ which, when in terpreted  by reference to 
appropriate legal norms, calls into or out o f  conceptual existence a duty  (or, fo r that 
m atter, a righ t or power and so on) then unless ’operative facts* have occurred at some 
prior tim e, ’du ty  acts’ or ’contra-duty  acts’ cannot by defin ition  themselves exist.
We should note, however, that a ’duty act* in the sense o f an act com plying w ith one 
legal norm  m ay at one and the same time constitute an ’operative fac t’ for purposes of 
another legal norm. For example, in conveyancing practice in Scots law the delivery 
of an executed conveyance to a purchaser o f heritable property both satisfies the 
contractual obligation to deliver the conveyance and also constitutes an act which in 
terms o f the actual content o f the conveyance, on registration in an appropriate  public 
register o f interests in land, creates an unfathom able netw ork o f property rights. The 
delivery o f the executed conveyance (followed by its registration) is to that extent at 
least one o f the ’operative facts’ constitutive of the consequential property rights. 29
It should be noted that there is a certain correspondence between types o f ’institutional
16
fact’ or ’ju ral fact’ (in the broad sense) and the structural elements o f the social norm 
identified earlier. These structural elements hold for the substantive righ t-du ty  legal 
norm also, bu t it is clearly true of all substantive legal norm s, both righ t-du ty  and 
pow er-liability , that a further structural element may be added. Indeed this is 
suggested by separate analyses o f John Finnis 30 and J.W. Harris 31 which were 
referred  to in previous discussion. This further structural elem ent specifies the factual 
conditions governing the applicability or other operative prerequisites o f the legal 
norm. To take an example, a legal norm may provide: MUnder circumstances n, A shall 
have a legal right in a question with B that B shall a ...". H ere, circumstances n would 
constitute the relevant ’operative facts’ o f the norm , and the happening of 
circumstances n would afford the necessary basis fo r asserting a righ t-du ty  legal 
relationship betw een A and B in terms of which B is under a duty  to 0 in a question 
with A.
Other situations or states of ’fact’ which may be interpreted  by reference to a legal 
norm and which correspond to structural elements o f the legal norm  may be identified. 
First, there are those situations or states of ’fact’ which satisfy identification criteria  of 
persons of inherence: e.g. those having a legal right that o ther persons should act in a 
prescribed m anner. The norm may stipulate conditions w hich qualify the person of 
inherence as such, and these may be complex ’institutional facts* in their own right, 
e.g. a ’shareholder’ or a ’residuary legatee’ or a ’m arried wom an’.
Second, there are those situations or states o f ’fact’ which satisfy identification criteria 
of persons o f incidence: e.g. those having a legal duty  to act in a prescribed manner. 
Again, the norm  may stipulate similar conditions which qualify the person of 
incidence as such.
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Third, there are those situations or states o f ’fact* consisting o f human actions, or 
’facts’ or ’events* attributed to hum an action, which satisfy (or fail to satisfy) the 
prescription in the norm. In this sense it may be thought that prescribed actions shall, 
or ought to, or should, be perform ed in the fu tu re , or that prescribed actions ought to 
have been performed in the past. These actions are ’duty acts’ or ’con tra-du ty  acts’ in 
K ocourek’s sense. To make m atters more concrete, let us imagine that there is a legal 
norm in the law of delict which, to reflect legal relationality in the hypothetical 
situation which unfolds, is form ulated as follows:
If  B negligently collides his car with A’s car:
1. A has a legal right in a question w ith B that B shall pay compensation to 
A, and
2. B has a legal duty in a question w ith A that B shall pay compensation to 
A.
We should first note that the concept o f acting ’negligently’ is itself intrinsically 
normative in that it involves a duty o f care, the breach o f which is categorised as 
’negligence*. Thus we should assume that the norm  as form ulated above is predicated  
upon a prior duty on B to the effect that if  B drives his car on the road (at all), this 
being the ’operative fact’ of the ’negligence’ norm , he is under a duty in a question 
with every road-user (including A) to drive ’carefully*. The question o f what does, or 
does not, constitute driving ’carefully’ would depend on the appropriate legal rules.
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If  we take it that B does indeed drive ’negligently’ in breach o f his duty to drive 
carefully and moreover collides his car with A’s car then, in basic term s, these ’facts’ 
constitute the ’operative facts’ which, upon being interpreted by reference to the 
appropriate legal norms, afford a basis fo r conceiving of the legal norm ative situation 
o f A relative to B and of B relative to A in terms that A has a right that B should pay 
compensation to A, and B has a corresponding duty to pay compensation to A. If  the 
occurrence o f the appropriate ’operative facts* affords a basis for conceiving a legal 
relationship between A and B, then it may be assumed that the meaning ascribed to a 
given set o f ’operative facts* includes the conceptual linkage which such ’facts’ enable 
to be conceived between any appropriate legal personae.
A part from  the occurrence of appropriate ’operative facts’ there m ight otherwise be no 
reason to think that legally any given legal personae should be linked in any way at 
all, still less by reference to legal norms. Taking our example, if  A and B are 
complete strangers, and if  B had not collided his car with A’s car, then neither A nor 
B, nor anyone else, would presumably have any reason to think that there m ight be 
some legal linkage between them.
Only when all necessary and relevant ’facts’, w hether ’operative’ in the narrow  sense or 
’institutional’ or ’jural* in the broad sense, have occurred or obtain can we assert the 
ideative existence o f a legal relationship or ju ral relation between legal personae. 
When such ’facts’ do obtain, and legal m eaning is ascribed to them , i.e. they are 
’institutionalised’ in the sense of M acCormick and W einberger, we may say that a ju ra l 
relation ’crystallises’ or becomes concrete w ith respect to identifiable legal personae. 
In contrast, a ju ral relation which is m erely an hypothesis may have an ideative 
existence but has no application to actual concrete ’facts*.
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For present purposes, a ju ra l relation will be treated as having ’crystallised’ on the 
occurrence o f  relevant ’operative facts’ in a substantive rather than adjective context. 
Adjective legal norms incorporate operative conditions in the same sense as substantive 
legal norms, bu t the operative conditions of adjective legal norms stipulate the ’facts* 
upon the occurrence o f which the legal apparatus o f courts, tribunals and enforcem ent 
agencies are mobilised to take official action. A djective operative conditions are 
therefore tw o-layered. The first layer comprises substantive operative conditions in 
terms o f which a substantive legal relationship obtains between (potential) litigants. 
The second layer comprises adjective operative conditions in terms o f which adjective 
legal relationships obtain between litigants and the court.
Adjective operative conditions stipulate the ’dispute’, or questioned issue requiring 
determ ination, and stipulate procedural prerequisites to be satisfied, including 
formalities attending the ’raising’ o f an action and other prelim inary m atters, e.g. 
jurisdiction, title and interest to sue, competency o f the action, and so on.
A ’crystallised’ legal right or duty conceived at a substantive level m ay be found to 
have no value at an adjective level, for example, because it is unenforceable on 
account o f being tim e-barred. In such a case any ’operative facts* su fficien t to found 
substantive relationships between potential litigants may be sufficien t fo r inclusion 
among the ’operative facts’ of the adjective relationships. But in the case of 
tim e-barred actions, the fact that a stipulated period o f time has elapsed since the 
occurrence o f ’operative facts’ founding the substantive relationship constitutes an 
adjective ’operative fact* which is fatal to the successful pursuit o f intended legal 
proceedings.
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It m ight then be argued that on a narrow view a legal right or duty may be described 
as ’crystallised’ only at the moment when judgm ent is given in favour o f a pursuer or 
p lain tiff, or against a crim inal (and therefore ’in favour oP a prosecutor). But this 
might elevate to an unnecessarily im portant position the role o f courts and 
enforcem ent agencies in conceiving o f legal relationships, and may suggest that the 
only dependable basis fo r orientation of human action by reference to legal norms is 
orientation following the judgm ent o f a court. An extrem e position o f this type, 
similar to that adopted by John Chipman Gray, 32 would ignore the possibility that 
many effective legally defined social relationships do not involve recourse to the courts 
because in some cases, often in the light of previous court decisions, there is a core of 
certainty as to the likely legal result o f a given course o f action. The sociological 
importance o f courts and enforcem ent agencies often resides less in their function 
actually to take coercive enforcem ent action in specific instances (im portant though 
this is) than to lay down authoritative criteria which define the basis upon w hich, i f  
resorted /o, they m ight be expected  to take coercive enforcem ent action.
A fu rther reason fo r treating substantive legal rights and duties as ’crystallising’ upon 
the occurrence o f substantive ’operative facts’, by way of justify ing  lim iting the use o f 
the term  .’jural relation’ to substantive legal relationships, is that substantive legal 
relationships are generally re-defined  when they come before a court. Substantive 
legal norms are only one basis for appropriate enforcem ent action being adjudged 
necessary or appropriate by a court. Other factors may be taken into account when a 
court issues judgm ent.
Thus, for example, if  there is a contract ad factum  praestandum  for building a wall,
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the substantive relationship involves the services which are the subject o f the 
contractual agreement. But if  a dispute arises following a perceived breach o f the 
contract, the court may seek to aw ard damages and also perhaps expenses, to the 
successful pursuer or p lain tiff, following determ ination o f the cause. In such a case 
the award o f damages is effectively a re-defin ition  o f a legal relationship or legally 
recognised normative relationship. This relationship originally entails perform ance o f 
an act which according to our hypothesis consists o f something other than paym ent o f 
money (i.e. building a wall). It may also be the case that when the contracting parties 
enter into the contract and define the basis o f their interaction the possibility o f the 
’non-building’ o f the wall leading to compensation (for whatever reason) as an 
alternative to building the wall may not enter their minds even as a rem ote likelihood.
By lim iting the use of the term  ’ju ra l relation’ to substantive legal relationships we do 
not diminish the importance o f adjective legal relationships which, as we discovered 
from  our earlier consideration o f the chess game model, can have a significant im pact 
either upon the content of the substantive relationship as defined by the court fo r its 
own purposes, or the content o f that relationship as re-defined  by the court.
VTHE JURAL RELATION
V .l The Sociological Point of View
The narrow er significance of Weber’s assertion that all knowledge o f cultural reality  is 
always knowledge from  particular points o f view 1 can be seen in the legal context in
the distinction, encountered already in chapter II 2 which Weber draw s, on the one
hand between the sociological point o f view (to be adopted in speaking o f ’law’, ’legal 
order’ or ’legal proposition’) and on the other hand, the point o f view o f ’legal 
dogmatics’ (’dogmatische Rechtswissenschaf/’) or jurisprudence. 3 The legal point o f 
view, according to Weber, asks what significance or normative meaning ought to be 
attribu ted  in correct logic to a verbal pattern  having the form  of a legal proposition. 
This point o f view, according to Weber, also aims to discover "... the correct m eaning 
o f propositions the content of which constitutes an order supposedly determ inative fo r 
the conduct o f a defined group of persons: in other words, it tries to define the facts 
to which this order applies and the way in which it bears upon them." 4
The sociological point of view, in contrast, asks:
"What actually happens in a group owing to the probability that persons engaged 
in social action ( Gemeinschaftshandeln)> especially those exerting a socially 
relevant amount of power, subjectively consider certain norms as valid and 
practically act according to them , in other words, orient their own conduct 
towards these norms?" 5
The distinction which Weber attempts to draw  between these contrasting points o f 
view is blurred by the recognition that substantial parts o f the Sociology o f  Law
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are devoted to (what certainly appear to be) concerns lying squarely w ithin the 
province of ’legal dogmatics’ or the jurid ical point o f view: fo r example, the 
traditional distinctions found in legal theory such as that betw een public law and 
private law, and between tort and crime. 6 But this alone would not be sufficient to 
support the claim  that there is some overlap between the concerns o f the sociological 
and jurid ical points o f view respectively. What does lend support to this is the 
realisation that it is simply not possible to adopt a point o f view which is concerned, 
among other things, w ith the ideative component o f hum an action (subjective meaning 
and such like) w ithout paying close attention to the concepts and conceptions which 
make  such action m eaningful to the participant actors. Weber reveals, however, that 
he had already grasped this possibility, and is apparently unaware that a concom itant 
o f this is the overlap of the sociological and jurid ical points o f view as he defines 
them. Thus, w ith in  a few pages o f outlining these respective points o f view, Weber 
rem arks,
"For a discipline such as sociology, which searches fo r em pirical regularities and 
types, the legal guarantees and their underlying normative conceptions are of 
interest both  as consequences and as causes or concom itant causes o f certain 
regularities o f hum an action which are as such directly relevant to sociology, or 
of regularities o f natural occurrences engendered by hum an action which as such 
are indirectly  relevant to sociology." 7
A concern w ith the underlying normative conceptions of legal guarantees is arguably 
located quite centrally within the province of analytical ju risprudence, and it would 
almost appear pedantic to search for evidence o f this were it not for the fact that 
there is at least a residuum  o f suspicion that Weber may have intended his definitions 
of the sociological and juridical points of view respectively to be m utually exclusive.
Taking Weber’s Sociology o f  Law  as a whole, though, this residual suspicion proves 
unfounded and serves as a warning not to place undue emphasis on isolated
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observations considered out of context. In the opinion o f at least one jurist, Roscoe 
Pound, the normative conceptions underlying legal phenom ena are a central concern of 
analytical jurisprudence. Weber’s analysis therefore does enable us to argue fo r a 
syncretism of the sociological and juridical points o f view. As Pound argues, one o f 
the tasks o f analytical jurisprudence is to examine "...the structure, subject m atter, and 
precepts o f a legal system in order to reach by analysis the principles, theories, and 
conceptions which it logically presupposes, and to organize the authoritative materials 
o f judicial and adm inistrative determ ination on this logical basis. It postulates, or 
takes as the ideal, a body of logically interdependent precepts." 8
Returning to Weber’s sociological point o f view, but always m indful o f its syncretic 
possibilities, we find , then, that according to a judgm ent o f sociological significance, a 
sociological analysis o f legally relevant social action (and o f underlying legal 
conceptual phenomena) should focus attention on persons engaged in social action who 
exert a socially relevant amount o f  power. M oreover, Weber’s reliance on both the 
Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften approaches is m anifested in that those 
who exert a socially relevant amount o f power, on the one hand, orient their conduct 
subjectively m eaningfully  by reference to norms which are considered to be valid, 9 
and on the other hand, act, in a manner susceptible of ’external’ em pirical cognition. 
These elements are furtherm ore expressed in term s o f probability.
The sociological point o f view thus locates the centre o f gravity o f the sociological 
analysis in those social actors whose action may be considered ’socially relevant’ in 
contrast to those actors whose action may be less significant or m erely peripheral to 
the principal forces at work within the legal order. 10
We have already identified the judicial social actor as a sociologically significant (and
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also ’socially relevant’) actor for purposes of our analysis, and, as we have previously 
m entioned, in chapter VI we will attem pt to form ulate an ideal-type construct o f the 
incum bent o f the ultimate jud icial office (Judex) in order to attain  an understanding 
o f the role played by the ’typical’ judicial actor (adm ittedly, theoretically conceived) in 
mobilising the coercive forces o f the legal order, and in shaping and delim iting the 
conceptual apparatus o f the ju ra l relation.
In this chapter we will consider the most fundam ental jurid ical elements o f the ju ral 
relation. To this end it will be assumed that, for theoretical purposes, the ju ra l 
relation is conceived from the point o f view of Iudex. Chapters V and VI should 
therefore be read ’in parallel’ to enable the ju ral relation to be visualised as an 
’em anation’ from this ultimate perspective.
Thus we assume that the content o f a substantive legal relationship (i.e. a ’ju ra l 
relation’) between legal personae in a given case is conceived not in  term s o f criteria  
o f relationality employed by the legal personae in question, valid and interesting 
though they may be, but in terms o f criteria  employed by the personnel o f the legal 
order, represented, according to our theoretical stance, by Iudex. From  this 
perspective, the jural relation is conceived as being ’projected onto’ or ascribed to 
legal personae, recalling Tim aschefFs reading o f Petrazycki. 11 In relation to rights and 
duties, we should note this observation made by Petrazycki:
"Legal phenomena consist o f unique psychic processes...expressed, incidentally, 
in the unique form of ascribing to d iffe ren t beings (not only to people, but to 
beings of various other classes, conceived o f in the m ind), or to certain classes 
o f such beings, ’duties’ and ’rights’; so that these beings, so conceived of, are 
seemingly found in certain peculiar conditions of being bound or o f possessing 
special objects (’rights’), and the like". 12
As a starting point for discussion in this chapter we will attem pt a defin ition  o f the
26
ju ra l relation. The suggested definition extends beyond the b rie f one already 
form ulated, 15 and necessarily draws upon aspects of the preceding analysis. ’Jural 
relation’, then, may be defined as a substantive legal relationship conceived according 
to criteria  o f relationality employed by the personnel o f a legal order, specifically 
courts, tribunals or other adjudicatory organs, and in the present context, Iudex. The 
ju ra l relation is an ascriptive ideative device which, through the linking m edium  of a 
legal norm and upon the perceived occurrence o f ’operative facts’, projects a legal 
conceptual linkage between polarised legal personae in terms that a persona o f 
inherence has a right (or a power) in a question with a persona of incidence that the 
persona o f incidence shall act in a specified m anner defined by the legal norm , and 
the persona o f incidence has a  duty (or a liability) in a question w ith the persona of 
inherence that the persona of incidence shall so act.
By adopting the point of view of Iudex  and conceiving o f the ju ra l relation as an 
’em anation’ from  this point o f view, we do not dim inish the im portance o f the point 
o f view o f those upon whom the law actually confers rights and duties. But w hen we 
consider that even when contracting parties enter into a contract whose term s are 
specifically agreed by the parties the law may nevertheless ’im port’ o ther term s into 
the contract or deny the ’contract’ legal validity, it is apparent that a point o f view 
other than that of the contracting parties is necessary. As P.S. A tiyah had said,
"Every law student is taught from  his earliest days that contractual in ten t is not 
really what it seems; actual subjective intent is normally irrelevant. It is the
appearance, the m anifestation of intent that m atters A party  who signs an
elaborate printed document is invariably held bound by it not because o f 
anything he intended; he is bound in the teeth o f his in tention and 
understandings except in some very exceptional cases o f fraud or the like. The 
tru th  is he is bound not so much because o f what he intends but because of 
what he does." 14
Elsew here, in a similar vein, Atiyah makes this observation:
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"More broadly, I suggest that there is today a growing recognition that, even 
where parties enter into a transaction as a result o f  some voluntary conduct, the 
resulting rights and duties of the parties are, in large part, a product o f the law, 
and not o f the parties’ real agreement." 15
Atiyah’s statem ent is perhaps a radical view o f the role o f legal institutions in defining 
or re-defin ing  a contractual relationship which has been established between 
contracting parties. A more moderate stance m ight reveal that the legal order in many 
cases does indeed take account of the meanings and intentions o f individuals whose 
action (or inaction) is relevant to an adjudication. This would seem to be true not 
only o f the recognition accorded by the law to ’norm atised’ social or economic 
arrangements such as contractual agreements, but o f the recognition given to the 
mental elem ent o f crimes or delicts, and generally to the concept o f intentionality 
which perm eates legal thought.
Returning to the example of contract, it is clear that although the law may infer 
m atters not specifically agreed upon by the parties from  the actions o f the parties, and 
may fu rth e r im port terms into the agreement which were not the subject of 
negotiation, generally speaking the law will not so distort the agreem ent made between 
parties that the legal re-definition o f the parties’ agreem ent is conceptually and 
contentually remote from  what the parties reasonably expected from  their agreement. 
(If this were the case, courts would surely become obsolete so fa r  as regards their 
involvement in granting remedies for contract based disputes).
Thus, to take an extreme example, it is unlikely that a Scottish court would give 
judgm ent in favour o f a landlord in an action against a tenant fo r enforcem ent o f a 
conventional irritancy in a commercial lease by m aking an award to the landlord o f 
half a ton o f topsoil. The point is that this in all probability is conceptually the
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remotest remedy imaginable to the parties in term s o f their expectations arising from  
the lease. But on the other hand, the court would (if relevant to the action) probably 
have regard to the Law Reform  (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 
contrary to the terms o f the lease as this makes provision fo r minimum notice to be 
served by the landlord on the tenant prior to the lease being treated as term inated. 16 
If  in accordance with the lease a notice is served on the tenant stipulating a period for 
remedying a rental default shorter than that prescribed by the 1985 Act, the court 
would look to the provisions o f the Act as a determ inant o f the rights and duties of 
the parties rather than to the provisions o f the lease, the form er o f which, according 
to normal rules of construction, overrules the latter. This would be in spite o f the fact 
that the provisions of the lease might be thought in some sense to represent the 
intentions o f the parties.
But even if  in this specific respect the lease did not represent the intentions of the 
parties, the point here is that nevertheless the context in which a dispute arises is one 
in which a great range of subject m atter could be considered to fall quite com fortably 
within the scope o f what the parties reasonably intended should flow from  their 
agreement. Thus, irrespective o f whether the parties are fully  conversant with the 
minutiae of the lease or of the law so far as bearing on the lease, a leasing 
arrangement (whatever that normally entails) is involved, and is known to be involved 
according to the knowledge and understanding o f the parties. So unless the parties are 
commercially naive when they enter into this arrangem ent they must at least be taken 
to know that the relationship established between them  involves in some way the use 
and enjoym ent of land or of a building erected on the land, and so on. We must also 
credit the contracting parties with sufficient insight into the implications o f their 
transaction that they appreciate that the docum ent they have signed is, in all
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probability, capable of being taken before a court of law in the event o f a dispute and 
that either party may then, to use Weber’s phrase, invoke "...in favor o f his ideal or 
m aterial interests the aid o f a ’coercive apparatus’ which is in special readiness fo r this 
purpose." 17
On the other hand, there is a vast subject m atter which the parties would consider 
completely irrelevant to the m atters in issue. Thus according to the example given, 
not only would half a ton o f topsoil be irrelevant under normal circum stances but so 
also would television sets, babies, old master paintings, sailing ships, Ming vases and 
grand pianos.
In crim inal law, substantial recognition is given to the elem ent o f intentionality  or 
more broadly, the ’crim inality’, o f crim inal conduct which, as a com ponent o f actions 
constituting a ’crim e’ or an ’offence’, is taken into account in determ ining the content 
o f any legal relationships that may subsist between an accused person and a prosecutor, 
representing the communal or public interest, in a prosecution brought against the 
person accused. 18
The prima facie  existence o f a pow er-liability relationship between a prosecutor and 
an accused person (in the sense o f power to ’prosecute’ and liability to be ’prosecuted’) 
is dependent upon the fact o f an accusation being made against the person accused 
that he has committed an offence. This fact, by virtue of certain legal norms, may in 
turn  depend upon the allegation that there exist certain ’operative facts’ which may 
include the perceived existence o f a certain degree of ’criminal in tentionality’ present 
at the time of commission o f the offence. Given this background o f assum ptions, it 
could not then be claimed that the point o f view of Iudex  fails to take account o f the
30
individual point o f view i.e. that of the individual subjected to the ’prosecution’ 
process.
But the examples draw n from  contract law and crim inal law should be qualified 
slightly. We should note that a distinction must be drawn between the conceptual acts 
involved in creating contractual relationships which are directly  constitutive o f the 
normative relationships obtaining between contracting parties, and the m ental element 
o f crim inal conduct which is not in any acceptable sense directly constitutive o f any 
normative relationship: not, at any rate, between the accused and his victim . (The 
victim  does not normally ’agree’ to be criminally wronged!) But we can draw 
approxim ate (if somewhat rudim entary) similarities between the way in which the law 
’takes account’ of the mental component in both crim inal conduct and 
contract-constituting acts if  we recognise that in each case the necessary mental 
component constitutes part o f the ’operative facts’ requiring to be established in order 
to assert the existence o f a ju ra l relation. A criminal law pow er-liab ility  ju ra l relation 
may be illustrated by an example. In the example the m ental com ponent o f the 
crim inal act takes the form  of the rather colourful ’anglicisation’ : ’with malice 
aforethought’. This represents the mens rea element of the ’operative facts’ o f the 
crime.
If B ’with malice aforethought’, murders his brother,
1. A (in the role o f prosecutor) has a legal power in a question w ith B that B 
shall subject him self to the prosecution process, and
2. B has a legal liability (Hohfeldian sense) in a question w ith A that B shall 
subject him self to the prosecution process.
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Taking the contract example and basing this again on M acCormick’s indefatigable 
M orningside commuter, the mental com ponent o f this resides in the intention 
expressed or implied by the comm uter that he wishes transport to (say) Princes Street 
in retu rn  for payment to the bus owner o f a ’fare’. Thus,
If  A (a commuter) on boarding a bus, evinces an intention or desire to be 
transported to Princes Street in return  fo r paym ent o f a fare to B (the bus 
owner) and pays B the required fare,
1. A has a legal right in a question w ith B that B shall transport A to Princes
Street, and
2. B has a legal duty in a question with A that B shall transport A to Princes
Street.
The fact o f the m atter, then, is that on a more m oderate reading of Atiyah so fa r  as
concerning contracts or other legally relevant fields o f interest, such as delict,
property, criminal conduct and so on, the law does pay m anifest regard to subjective 
meanings intended by litigating or other relevant parties and to wider contexts o f 
meaning in which actions have been perform ed and intentions expressed or im plied. 
But we should still be aware of those countervailing fields o f interest in which the 
subjective component of actions is either not at all, or only partially, taken into 
account for legal purposes. For instance, in crim inal law there are the areas o f strict 
and absolute liability, 19 and the law of contract recognises the field  o f 
quasi-contract. 20 Of course these are only a few  examples and many more instances
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could be cited, following Atiyah, in which the subjective com ponent o f actions is only 
partially taken account of, the law often in a sense ’supplying* whatever else may be 
required to establish appropriate ’operative facts’: fo r exam ple, legal fictions 21 or 
presum ptions, implied contractual conditions, inferences (from  facts), requirem ents of 
form al (as against substantive) validity o f w ritten docum ents, 22 and so on. Clearly 
subjective facts are as much the concern of the law as are purely ’external’ facts.
The conclusion to be drawn is therefore obvious. The theoretically conceived 
viewpoint o f Iudex  must reflect the possibility that so far as necessitated by legal 
norms, courts o f law do take account o f subjective components o f hum an action. 
These components may comprise ’operative facts* to which the norms in question are 
applicable. But if  the law does take account o f such components, it is on terms 
exclusively  se t by the law according to any legal considerations establishing the terms 
of recognition o f the subjective elements in question.
Taking the broad example in Scots law of sponsiones ludicrae, 23 parties may well 
enter into a gaming transaction, little realising that irrespective o f any expectations 
they may have personally, any ’contractual’ undertaking made by them  may, as a 
m atter o f legal policy, be unenforceable on the ground that it is unw orthy to occupy 
the tim e of the courts. 24
The law, therefore, stipulates the terms o f exclusion and the terms o f recognition o f 
subjective components of hum an action, and while the view point o f Iudex , 
representing ’authoritative legal meaning*, does not necessarily exist in a conceptual 
vacuum rem ote from  the meanings or understandings of litigants or potential litigants, 
it may well do , since this is a fundam ental and unavoidable, yet fascinating, dimension
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of the phenomenon of law.
V.2 The Ju ra l Relation
The conceptual apparatus of the ju ra l relation by no means originated in the juristic  
writings of H ohfeld and K ocourek, although the term  ’ju ra l relation* appears to have 
done. While these writers are certainly the principal twentieth century exponents o f 
jural relational theorising, the notion o f the jural relation, as we shall b riefly  consider 
in a moment, probably had its historical origins at least as early as the Roman Law 
concept of the legal bond (Juris vinculum) which was employed by Justinian in the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis. 25 Yet if  Hohfeld was not the first to pu t forw ard the notion o f 
the ju ral relation there can be little doubt that his justly  fam ous and unarguably 
brilliant configuration o f ju ra l relations represents one o f the most articulate 
contributions to the literature o f analytical jurisprudence, and indeed the veritable 
outpouring o f secondary ’H ohfeldian’ literature testifies conclusively to the influence 
which Hohfeld has had in twentieth century legal theory. 26
But Hohfeld’s contribution to legal theory, ironically, does not lie in the fact that he 
actually articulated a theory of ju ra l relations, although he unquestionably theorised 
about ju ral relations. Hohfeld would probably have been the first to deny that what 
he was attem pting in Fundamental Legal Conceptions was, in theoretical term s, 
anything more ambitious than a dissertation aimed at clarifying basic conceptions o f 
the law, and indeed his dissertation, for all its theoretical im portance, often am ounts to 
no more than an attem pt to clarify various terminological usages prevalent in practical 
legal discourse. Hohfeld made no great claims fo r his dissertation and even specified
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that its readership should be ’law school students’ rather than ’any other class of 
readers’. 27
Yet in the light of its ju ristic  significance one m ight well ask w hether Hohfeld either 
unconsciously underestim ated the likely impact o f his dissertation, or realising its 
likely impact, in all modesty consciously understated his objective:
"If ... the title o f this article suggests a merely philosophical inquiry as to the 
nature o f law and legal relations ... the w riter may be pardoned fo r repudiating 
such a connotation in advance. On the contrary ... the main purpose o f the 
w riter is to emphasize certain oft-neglected m atters that may aid in the 
understanding and in the solution o f practical, everyday problems o f the law. 
With this end in view, the present article and another soon to follow will 
discuss, as o f chief concern, the basic conceptions o f the law ... ." 28
Curiously, Hohfeld does not attem pt to define  the concept of the ju ra l relation and 
this certainly adds weight to the view that his dissertation is essentially a practical one. 
Kocourek, on the other hand, whose approach is rather more scholarly, though not 
necessarily more enlightening, 29 undertakes a critical assessment o f a num ber o f 
possible definitions drawn mainly from  the work of nineteenth century  jurists. 
According to Kocourek, the ju ris t Puntschart, while recognising that Savigny had 
’vaguely apprehended’ the juris vinculum element o f the ju ra l relation, 30 relied upon 
this Roman law conception. Through the application o f legal norms legal bonds were 
created "by which persons were gyved to persons and persons to things fo r defin ite 
purposes within the purview of the law." 31 Puntschart had also shown how the ’bond’ 
idea runs through the whole system of Roman legal conceptions. As K ocourek says,
"Puntschart... interposes a new mechanical element, the ’juris  vinculum*, as a 
kind o f distributing center through which legal advantages are apportioned 
among the members o f a legal society as the purpose of the law directs. The 
norm creates the legal bond and from  the legal bond are derived such claims and 
duties as are appropriate." 32
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The Roman law notion of the juris vinculum , as we have already noted, derived from 
the em peror Justinian, who employed it in his definition o f obligation:
"Nunc transeamus ad obligationes. Obligatio est iuris vinculum, quo necessitate 
adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei, secundum nostrae civitatis iura"
(Now let us turn  to obligations. An obligation is a legal bond w hereby we are 
constrained by the need to perform  something according to the laws o f our 
state.) 33
In the Digest, in similar fashion, Justinian defines obligation as follows:
"Obligationum substantia non in eo consistit, ut aliquod corpus nostrum aut 
seruitutem nostram facial, sed ut alium nobis obstringat ad dandum aliquid uel 
faciendum  uel praestandum ”
(The essence o f obligations does not consist in that it makes some property or a 
servitude ours, but that it binds another person to give, do, or perform  
something for us.) 34
According to J.A.C. Thomas, the developed Roman law idea o f a legal bond existing 
between parties contained no other subjection than that o f the duty to perform  or pay 
damages, but the language of the definitions given above had clear associations with 
bondage and this more literal connotation reflected something o f the true nature of 
obligation as conceived in early Roman law. 35 It m ight be argued, then, that it 
required only a step, and not a great intellectual leap, to move from  the notion of 
physical bonds or fetters to that o f conceptual bonds in which the conceptual linkage, 
which gyved persons to persons and persons to things, to use K ocourek’s phrase, was 
more im portant than the physical linkage. It is indeed often the case that in the 
developm ent o f a legal system the increasing sophistication o f the law is accompanied 
by a corresponding movement from requirem ents centring on essentially ’physical 
facts’ to requirem ents centring on ’ideative facts’. In Scots law an historical example 
o f this is to be found in the act of giving ’sasine’ or symbolic delivery o f land in 
which the superior’s bailie delivered earth and stone of the ground, or some other
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appropriate symbol, to the attorney o f the vassal. 36 With the developm ent o f the law, 
this cerem ony became obsolete.
The Rom an law notion o f the legal bond, w ith its original connotations of 
dom inance-servience is perhaps as enlightening on an heuristic level in characterising 
the ju ra l relation as anything to have emerged during two m illennia o f legal 
philosophy. Puntschart’s clarification o f the Rom an law idea o f ju ris  vinculum is 
w ithout doubt a more concrete rendition of this notion but, more im portantly, it 
emphasises the conceptual linkage element o f the ju ra l bond or Rechtsverband as 
Puntschart term s it. 37
The notion o f ju ral relation as conceptual linkage finds its expression in H ohfeld’s
arrangem ent o f relations in the form  of a scheme o f correlatives and opposites, in
which ju ra l correlatives represent each side o f one ju ra l relation, viewed from  the 
point o f view of each party to the relation. 38 A ustin had anticipated this correlativity 
when he defined ’legal right’ as "... the creature o f a positive law: and it answers to a 
relative duty  imposed by that positive law, and incum bent on a person or persons 
other than the person or persons in whom the right resides.” 39 Taking this fu rther, 
Austin observed:
"In o ther words, all rights reside in persons, and are rights to acts or 
forbearances on the part of other persons. Considered as corresponding to
duties, or as being rights to acts or forbearances, rights may be said to avail
against persons."
The correlativity  o f ju ral relations means that one term  of the relation (e.g. the right) 
implies the o ther term  (the duty) and vice versa. It is not proposed to argue here that 
this correlativity  or mutual dependence arises from  anything that may conclusively be 
said to inhere in the nature of all rights or o f all duties as such, fo r it has been
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convincingly argued that some duties are not necessarily correlated with other people’s 
rights. Joel Feinberg draws attention to three classes o f such duties: duties o f status, 
duties o f obedience and duties of compelling appropriateness. 41 Similarly, 
MacCormick has argued that there are some rights (legal rights, no less) w hich, being 
logically prior to any correlative duties, are therefore, it follows, ’dutiless’ rights. 42
It may be that in the final analysis, many of these cases m ay resolve into disputes 
about the meaning o f the words ’right’ or ’duty* or o f preferred  usages o f these words 
and it is, in any case, beyond the scope o f the present analysis to consider these 
meanings or usages save to point out that for our present purposes it is proposed to 
focus attention only on the class of legal rights which (as it so happens) are correlative 
to duties, and correspondingly, the class of duties which are correlative to rights. 
Having said that, though, it is d ifficult to imagine any right which, having a social 
dimension, does not in some sense ’avail against* some other person or persons, 
whether determ inate or indeterminate.
Now the correlativity o f the class of righ t-duty  and cognate ju ra l relations resides in 
that the content o f someone’s right is precisely equivalent to the content o f  someone 
else’s duty in terms o f the subject m atter of the prescribed act. Similarly, in  such a 
case, the content o f someone’s duty is precisely equivalent to the content o f someone 
else’s right. But we should not think that this contentual equivalence enables us to 
argue that a right is a duty or a duty is a right. This is precisely the m istake that Max 
Radin makes when he says:
A’s dem and-right and B’s duty in I are not correlatives because they are not 
separate, however closely connected, things at all. They are not even two 
aspects o f the same thing. They are two absolutely equivalent statem ents o f the 
same thing. B’s duty does not follow from  A’s right, nor is it caused by it. B’s
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duty is A’s right. The two terms are as identical in what they seek to describe 
as the active and passive form of indicating an act; ’A was m urdered by B’; or 
’B m urdered A’. The fact that A and B are wholly distinct and separate persons 
must not be allowed to obscure the fact that a relation betw een them is one 
relation and no more. 4S
Radin’s error is compounded by his assertion that the fact that A and B are distinct 
persons may obscure the fact that the relation between them  is one relation. It is 
because the parties to whom a ju ral relation is ascribed are d iffe ren t that each side of 
the relation requires a d ifferen t term to describe the position o f  the party who 
occupies that side.
Although A’s right that B should 0 is in terms o f content (i.e. the prescribed act of 
0-ing) equivalent to B’s duty to 0, if  the right were identical to the duty  in that case 
the relation would be meaningless. The point is that although there is identity  with 
respect to the content o f the prescribed act, there is non-iden tity  w ith respect to other 
aspects o f the relation. For example if  A has the right (that B shall 0) in m any cases 
he may have an accompanying feeling of expectation that B should 0 but no
accompanying feeling o f obligation or o f duty that he (A) should do anything at all.
On the other hand, if  B has the duty (to 0) in m any cases he may have an
accompanying feeling o f duty  that he should 0, in order to fu lfil A ’s anticipated
expectation. But it would not make sense to say that he (B) had any expectation (of 
himself) that he (B) should 0. He may of course expect A to feel ’satisfied’ if  he 
perform s act 0 in fu lfilm ent o f A’s anticipated expectation. But this fu rther 
expectation m erely serves to demonstrate the differences betw een the parties in terms 
o f their respective positions.
Nevertheless, Radin should be given credit for accentuating, adm ittedly by
overstatem ent, that there does exist identity of subject m atter w ith in  a ju ra l relation,
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in particular, that the act which is the subject o f the duty is also the subject of the 
right. Indeed we earlier considered other ’identities* occurring w ithin the normative 
relationship 44 and, briefly stated, these include: (1) that each party  acknowledges that 
a given act is to be perform ed by the same person (the du ty -bearer), (2) that each 
party  is presum ed to know the identity  o f his ’opposite number*, 45 and (3) that each 
party  is (normally) aware of the content o f the norms that govern his conduct.
The term s ’right* and ’duty’ therefore correspond to two quite d istinct perspectives or 
norm ative positions of parties who stand in a jural relation w ith respect to one 
another. Although we may recognise the main areas of identity  or equivalence within 
a ju ra l relation, the disparity between the positions of the respective parties must also 
be carefully  noted, and Radin’s error o f equating right with duty  should not be 
uncritically accepted.
If  we accept that each term of a ju ral relation, whether it be righ t or duty , implies the 
other term  o f the relation (i.e. A’s right implies B’s duty and vice versa) then it seems 
to follow that if  we wish to understand either term , we must at the same time 
understand the correlative term.
It follows from  this that each term  is inherently relational. Thus ’righ t’ has been 
defined as an expectation, 46 a protected interest, 47 an advantage, 48 a m anifestation 
or exertion o f the will, 49 a claim or dem and, 50 and a power. 51 But w hether in a 
given case a right may more appropriately fall w ithin one defin ition  or another, or be 
more readily explained by one or other competing theories o f a right, the notion that a 
righ t implies a correlative duty in the context of a righ t-du ty  relationship means that 
in theorising about rights it is necessary to accept that the content o f the righ t is an
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act which is the subject of a duty incum bent on other persons. The term  ’right’ 
therefore in this context, in a sense, contains the notion o f another’s duty, even if  
other com peting versions of the concept o f the right are nonetheless valid.
Similarly, if  a duty  may be defined as an ought, 62 or a disadvantage, 63 or a debt, 54 
or that which is obligatory or due, 55 in the context o f a righ t-du ty  relationship it also 
contains the notion o f another person having the right or expectation or claim or 
demand that the person obligated should act in a particular m anner in fulfilm ent o f 
the other person’s right, expectation, or other condition.
Thus to the extent that a duty is owed to someone else, as it would be in the context 
of a rig h t-d u ty  relationship, then ’duty’ itself is a relational notion in that it contains 
the notion o f the other person who is in the position of right-holder.
The result o f  this is that if  each term o f a ju ra l relation can be defined independently 
yet can also contain the other term of the relation, then to be com prehensible the ju ral 
relation m ust be treated as one conceptual unit. This does not lead to vicious 
circularity  because each term is independent o f the other term  according to its own 
definition. In any case, as we have stressed earlier, neither term  is capable o f being 
defined as the o ther term.
This, then, recalls Parsons’ remark that it is crucial to attend to the relations between 
actors in order to reveal the structure o f the social system. 56 The relation itself is 
something com prehensible in its own right and also something that aids comprehension. 
To conceive o f legal phenomena in terms of legal relationships rather than in term s o f 
legal norms is one o f the first steps towards gaining an insight into the essentially
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social nature o f those phenomena. Of course, this is not to m inim ise the legal norm as 
a medium which defines legal relationships, and indeed we cannot overlook how the 
structural elem ents o f the legal norm, considered earlier, facilitate  our understanding 
of legal relationships as relationships between persons, w hether ’natural’ or ’jurid ical’. 
Nevertheless the conceptual unit of the legal relationship should be seen as the primary 
unit of social thinking or sociological theorising about the law.
V.3 The Legal R elation as Social Relationship
The Russian ju ris t N.M . Korkunov who died in 1902 did not by any means advance a 
sociological analysis o f law based on the notion o f social relationality , but at several 
points in his General Theory o f  Law  57 he dem onstrated that he had grasped the 
essential correspondence between legal relations and social relationships. For instance, 
he says,
"Since legal relations are also social relations, but governed by a legal rule, it is 
necessary in order to explain them satisfactorily to treat firs t o f  the relations in 
general." 58
Korkunov then elaborates on the notion of the legal relation as social relationship by 
arguing that social relationships are transformed into legal relations by means o f the 
conceptual apparatus o f rights and duties:
"Men, so fa r  as they aid themselves by legal rules, transform  their social 
relations into legal ones, social dependence into a legal obligation, and the power 
of influence w hich they have over each other into rights. The legal rules fixing 
hum an interests delim it necessarily the realization o f those interests and impose 
upon each m an some obligation of guaranteeing the realization o f others* 
interests. So the law adds to the existing bases o f m utual dependence a new 
one, a legal base. If  my relations with other m en are fixed  by law, the 
realization o f my interests depends not only upon social conditions, bu t also
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upon my legal rights and my legal duties. At the same tim e, conform ably to 
these obligations there is created for others a possibility o f influencing me in a 
particular way under the form  of legal claims." 59
Korkunov’s theoretical stance leads him to postulate not only that every legal relation 
is composed of a right and a duty , 60 but also that legal relations subsist only between 
persons, whether jurid ical or natural, and not between persons and things. This 
position seems to be a concom itant o f Korkunov’s more general posture in terms of 
which legal relations are conceived o f as (in a sense) ’jurid icised’ social relationships.
Thus, as K orkunov insists:
"We cannot in this m atter subscribe to the opinion o f D ernburg, Regelsberger, 
Mouromtzev and some others who recognize the existence o f ju rid ical relations 
with regard to things. The relation of the proprietor o f a thing with that thing 
is not distinguishable from  the relation of that thing towards one who has no 
right over it. The proprietor, ju st like one who has no ow nership but uses it, 
employs the object according to fixed technical rules and according to personal 
taste. The only d ifference between the one and the o ther is in  relation to other 
persons." 61
Korkunov holds that legal relations exist "not between an individual and a thing, but 
only between several individuals on account o f the use of a thing " 62 and this clears 
the way for his more fundam ental statement of the nature o f legal relations as 
essentially social relationships.
"Legal relations, it is readily seen, are possible, then, only betw een individuals. 
Only individuals can be subjects of juridical relations. They alone are capable 
o f them." 63
Korkunov is right to insist that the only ’true’ legal relations are essentially social 
relationships defined by legal norms, if  that is indeed what he holds. As we suggested 
earlier, a social norm is a deontic proposition which functions as a reference point for 
the orientation by an actor of his social action (that is, his action w ith respect to other 
individuals). It follows then that if  a relationship between one social actor and another 
is defined at least partly by such a norm, the relationship so defined  is one subsisting
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between individuals and not one subsisting between individuals and inanim ate objects. 
The point here is not that one cannot ’take account of1 an inanimate object in acting, 
in the same way as one ’takes account o r  another individual in acting socially, because 
one can. The point is rather that in acting w ith respect to the p roperty  (say) of 
someone else, and in so acting making reference to social norms, for exam ple, property 
laws, it is o f greater significance, both legally and sociologically, that the  actor in 
question is acting socially and taking account o f the property-ow ning individual, than 
that he is acting, in any strict sense, ’w ith respect to’ the property, which o f  course he 
is as well. The property laws in question are conceived for the benefit o f the property 
owner, not fo r the ’benefit’ o f the property as such.
This is not to say, though, that a relationship o f the type envisaged in the present 
context (i.e. a ’conceptual linkage’) cannot subsist between individuals and inanim ate 
objects. This is not denied, nor can it plausibly be argued that individuals do not 
perceive themselves in countless situations as standing in a relation to an inanim ate 
object. It is a basic human instinct to conceive o f something as ’one’s ow n’ or ’his’ 
and this would still in all probability be so even if  someone lived com pletely outside a 
social context. A desert island scenario comes readily to m ind in w hich a stranded 
seafarer surrounds himself with his ’possessions’ irrespective o f the absence o f  ’others’ 
on the island.
K orkunov, then, perhaps overstates his case slightly, because the law does recognise 
the conceptual linkages which individuals make between themselves and inanim ate or 
even anim ate objects such as animals. According to John Finnis, the H ohfeldian 
approach which translates all relations into relations subsisting betw een individuals, 
may fail to provide a full elucidation of lawyers’ ascriptions o f rights. 64 As Finnis
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says,
"Lawyers frequently  talk about rights, not as three-term  relations between two 
persons and an act o f a certain type, bu t as tw o-term  relations between persons 
and one sub jec t- m atter or (in a broad sense) thing: fo r example, someone’s right 
to £10 under a contract... . The reason why such a tw o-term  ascription of 
rights is p referred  by lawyers, in many contexts, is this: it gives an intelligible 
unity  to a tem poral series of the many and varying sets o f  H ohfeldian rights 
which at d ifferen t times one and the same set o f rules provides in order to 
secure and give substance to one subsisting  objective." 65
The point here is that the right is seen as ’attaching* to the thing. But this is merely 
conceptual shorthand, for the thing is not the holder o f a right or bearer o f a duty. It 
does not, in o ther words, occupy any ’side* o f a ju ral relation as this is the exclusive 
domain o f individuals or juridical persons. The relationship therefore betw een a 
person and a thing (in so far as, for example, a person conceives o f something as ’his 
own’) is not a ju ra l relation. It may often be a relation which is in some sense 
recognised by the law, but it is not a normative relationship in the sense o f the present 
analysis.
Having clarified  some of the essential features o f the ju ra l relation and placed the 
notion in the context o f its historical developm ent to the point to which H ohfeld and 
his followers brought it, it is convenient now to give more thorough consideration to 
the defin ition  o f the ju ral relation suggested earlier.
According to our definition, the jural relation is a substantive legal relationship 
conceived according to criteria o f relationality employed by the personnel o f a legal 
order, and therefore in terms of the present analysis, ’emanating* from  the construct 
Iudex. Such criteria  of normative relationality as are employed by Iudex  m ay be 
directly specified in legal norms where, for example, a duty is directly imposed on 
legal persona  A to perform  act 0 in a question w ith legal persona B. Thus, in term s o f
45
section 111 o f the Rent (Scotland) Act 1984:
"It shall be a condition of a protected tenancy o f  a dw elling-house that the 
tenant shall afford  to the landlord access to the dw elling- house and all 
reasonable facilities for executing therein any repairs which the landlord is 
entitled to execute". 66
But this provision also shows that relational criteria  m ay be indirectly specified in
legal norms in that a contractual duty is afforded legal recognition even though the law
has not directly  specified the content of the duty. Thus, section 111 presupposes that
the parties have already  stipulated norms defining how each shall act in relation to the
other. The norms in question are not in any accepted sense legal norms, although they
are, by and large, recognised and enforced by the legal order. 67
Many examples can be given of situations in which the law affords recognition to 
normative arrangements ’posited’ by individuals: wills or o ther testam entary writings, 
conveyances, m emoranda and articles of association o f com panies, deeds o f trust and 
club constitutions and, o f course, contracts.
As a jural relation is also defined as an ascriptive ideative device which projects a 
conceptual linkage between polarised legal personae, it may be helpful to visualise this 
in the context of our chess game model. To this end, we m ay substitute for Hamlet 
the ideal-type construct Iudex. It is also necessary to substitute fo r Rosencrantz a 
righ t-inherent legal persona (whom we shall call ’R P’), and for G uildenstern, a 
du ty-incident legal persona (whom we shall call ’DP’). By this means, Iudex  assumes 
the role of the um pire in the model. We may also assume that the relationships 
obtaining between Hamlet and each of Rosencrantz and G uildenstern respectively also 
obtain between Iudex  and RP and DP respectively.
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M aking all necessary substitutions, then, the diagram takes on the following 
appearance.
R I G H T
I U D E X
\
\
D UT Y
Let us assume that RP has a substantive legal right in a question w ith DP that DP shall 
0 and that DP has a substantive legal duty in a question w ith R P that DP shall 0. 
Each ’arm* of the model represents the respective poles o f the individuated righ t-du ty  
ju ral relation. (This is shown in the diagram, the left arm being designated ’R IG H T’ 
and the right arm being designated ’DUTY’).
It can readily be seen that the adjective legal relationship obtaining betw een Iudex  and 
RP ’contains’ the substantive legal relationship obtaining between R P and DP (i.e. the 
R P-D P jural relation). Similarly, the adjective legal relationship obtaining between
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Iudex  and DP also ’contains1 the substantive legal relationship obtaining betw een RP 
and DP. Thus the position of Iudex  v is-a -v is  either party (whether it be RP or DP) 
m ust always take account of the position o f  that party  vis-^-vis the other party. Based 
on the diagram  in chapter III, the broken lines represent adjective legal relationships, 
while the continuous lines represent substantive legal relationships, or ju ra l relations.
Simply put, the adjective legal relationship (’containing’ the jural relation) defines 
what Iudex  will ’do’ in a question w ith R P and in a question with DP, firstly  on 
account o f RP’s having a substantive legal right in a question with DP that DP shall 0, 
and secondly on account of DP’s having a substantive legal duty in a question w ith RP 
that DP shall 0.
But we should also note that each term  o f the substantive legal relationship obtaining 
between RP and DP (i.e. the right and the duty  respectively) also ’contains’ the notion 
of its correlative term in the sense discussed earlier. To be more concrete, the act o f 
DP’s 0-ing  is at one and the same tim e the subject both of RP’s right and DP’s duty. 
O f course, the substantive legal relationship between RP and DP is conceived 
according to the understanding of Iudex , not according to the understanding o f R P or 
DP. Indeed in the present study the essence o f legal relationality consists in that the 
ju ra l relation is conceived by, and from , the unique perspective of Iudex.
Against this background, it is appropriate now to consider Hohfeld’s scheme o f  ju ra l 
relations, firstly  as a scheme of ju ral relations (i.e. as an arrangem ent o f ju ra l 
correlatives and jural opposites) and secondly as substantive legal relationships which 
are capable of individuation and w hich, at least in principle, are separate and 
distinguishable from  one another.
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V.4 H ohfeld’s Scheme of Jural Relations
H ohfeld’s celebrated arrangement of ju ra l relations as a table o f jural correlatives and 
ju ra l opposites has been reproduced in countless monographs and textbooks and is the 
part o f his work to which reference is most frequently  made, whether in general 
writings on analytical jurisprudence, or in w ritings specifically addressing the subject 
o f ju ra l relations.
In Fundamental Legal Conceptions, H ohfeld’s arrangem ent o f jural relations takes on 
the following appearance: 68
Jural Opposites
Jural Correlatives
right privilege power im m unity
no-right duty disability liability
right privilege power im m unity
duty no -righ t liability disability
Subsequent writers have preferred to show ju ra l correlativity and ju ral opposition (or 
ju ra l ’contradiction’ 69) subsisting together in two tables, one table applying to the
righ t ’stricto sensu' family of jural relations, and the other applying to the power
fam ily o f ju ral relations. 70 The following tables are based loosely on the tables which 
appear in the eleventh edition of Salmond on Jurisprudence. It should be noted that 
G lanville Williams, the editor, argued that H ohfeld’s ’privilege’ was best conceived of 
as a ’liberty  (not)’, 71 and Salmond him self preferred  to substitute ’subjection’ for
H ohfeld’s ’liability’. 72 The two tables are arranged w ithin rectangles, yet there is no
necessary relationship between the rectangles, for, as Salmond says:
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"As we shall see, the four concepts within each rectangle are intim ately related 
to each other, whereas there is not the same relationship between the concepts in 
the one rectangle and the concepts in the other rectangle."7S
In the tables, correlativity resides in the vertical lines, while opposition or 
contradiction resides in the diagonal lines.
Right (stricto 
sensu)
Duty
Liberty (not) 
(or N o-duty  or 
Privilege)
i
N o-right
Im m unity 
(or N o-liability)
Power
Liability  Disability
(or Subjection) (or N o-pow er)
The derivative Hohfeldian arrangem ent o f ju ral relations in the form  of two tables 
reflecting the dichotomy between the right and power families o f ju ral relations, 
rather than Hohfeld’s arrangement which reflects the dichotomy between ju ral 
opposition and jural correlativity, is substantially in line with what has become a 
distinctively twentieth century theoretical position in which a principled distinction has 
been draw n between, on the one hand rights (and duties) and on the other hand 
powers (and ’liabilities’). This distinction has only relatively recently been brought to 
the forefront o f jurisprudential writing by H .L.A. H art and has become so widely 
accepted that it is now almost ’trite jurisprudence’. W riting in 1964, Lon L. Fuller 
noted the coincidence of H ohfeld’s analysis and H art’s distinction between 
duty-im posing and power-conferring rules:
"The Hohfeldian analysis discerns four basic legal relations: righ t-du ty , 
no-right-priv ilege, power-liability, and disability-im m unity. O f these, however, 
the second and fourth are simply the negations o f the first and third. 
Accordingly the basic distinction on which the whole system is built is that 
between right-duty  and pow er-liability; this distinction coincides exactly with 
that taken by Hart."74
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But Fuller’s assertion of an exact coincidence between the H ohfeldian and Hartian 
analyses of legal powers is perhaps over-confident, because on a closer exam ination of 
The Concept o f  Law  H art’s pow er-conferring rules are, on any ordinary language 
account, certainly pow er-conferring rules o f a kind , but not o f an Hohfeldian  kind. 
H art’s distinction between pow er-conferring and duty-im posing rules centres upon 
differences in the social functions which the respective rules perform .
"Legal rules defining the ways in which valid contracts or wills or marriages are 
made do not require persons to act in certain ways w hether they wish to or not. 
Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide individuals 
with facilities  fo r realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them 
to create, by certain specified procedures and subject to certain  conditions, 
structures o f rights and duties within the coercive fram ew ork o f the law." 75
The point here is that H art’s pow er-conferring rules are not, in any strict sense, 
relational pow er-conferring rules, though clearly the process o f (for example) making 
a will does involve the creation o f (among other things) pow er-conferring norms some 
of which may not be legal norms in any accepted sense.
If, therefore, we cast aside stricter and more sympathetic possible readings o f the 
H artian analysis of legal powers and assert, for example, that A has a legal power to 
make a will, this is not, without considerable analytical extension, a relational power. 
The point is this: in a question with whom does A have this power? If  A has a power 
to make a will who has a liability, for example, that the will be made? Taking H art’s 
example o f m arriage, if  A has a power to marry, who is under a liability to be 
m arried to A ?(!) Can A, by exercising his power to m arry, compel a Sheherazade to 
m arry him  -  a Sheherazade who is, incidentally, labouring under a correlative liability 
to be m arried?
But H art’s example of testamentary powers may be presented in terms o f H ohfeldian
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powers, and a first clue as to what might be involved in this is suggested by 
MacCormick:
"It might be objected that it does not take the law to enable people to make 
their own arrangements. Colin and Flora can set up house together and rear a 
family without regard to the law’s formalities. On his deathbed Colin can tell 
Flora and the children what he wants done with his possessions, and they, full 
o f conjugal or filial piety, m ay conceive themselves du ty-bound to do as he has 
said, and do it. The law o f the land, the positive law, does not facilita te  such 
simple and natural transactions. It fetters and restricts them  w ith burdensom e 
requirements -  and with costs." 76
In short, the law sets conditions fo r the recognition of legal powers created by a 
testator in favour of an executor. The testator empowers the executor to deal w ith his 
property in a certain way. On the death o f the testator there is no question o f a 
pow er-liability relationship existing as between the deceased testator and the executor. 
There are, however, legal powers created in the executor in a question with 
beneficiaries (whether potential, apparent or real), and anyone else having, or 
purporting to have, an interest in the deceased person’s estate. Depending on the 
nature, scope and content o f his powers, which are often determ ined by legal rules 
rather than ’testamentary norms’, an executor is legally capable o f carrying out 
innumerable transactions and o f subjecting persons to (Hohfeldian) ’liabilities’ at his 
discretion. Thus, for example, if  a bank has legal control of funds which belonged to 
the deceased testator, the executor normally has a power in a question w ith the bank 
to direct the bank to transfer the funds to the executor, or make some other 
appropriate transfer. Upon the valid exercise o f this power, the bank then has a legal 
duty in a question with the executor to transfer the funds in accordance w ith the 
executor’s direction, and the executor has a legal right in a question w ith the bank that 
it so transfer the funds.
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But the m atter is rather more complex than this. Innumerable other relationships are 
created: between one beneficiary and another, between each beneficiary and ’all the 
world’, between the executor and ’all the world’, between individual fund-ho lders and 
the executor, and between individual fund-holders and each beneficiary, and so on, ad  
infinitum . MacCormick makes a sim ilar observation in the course o f a discussion o f 
individuation o f legal rules:
"Even stronger is the case where I make a will which is valid in law. Only after 
my death does it become incum bent on or open to anyone to do anything about 
implementing my will. And then there are several d ifferen t classes o f people 
affected. Named executors can seek or decline judicial confirm ation; if  the 
court confirms their appointm ent, they incur the duty o f executing the 
provisions o f the will. Tax officials have also duties and powers in respect o f 
the estate. And so forth". 77
Thus we may conclude that there are no Hohfeldian powers as such to make wills, 
contracts or to enter into marriage. Instead there are legal rules which stipulate 
recognition or validity conditions, or procedures for the form al constitution, o f wills, 
contracts or m arriages, such institutions being by and large entered into voluntarily 
upon terms created by the parties and in term s o f powers, liabilities, rights and duties 
set out (if at all) in the written documents or oral statements o f the parties. In the 
case o f testamentary arrangements, if  there are any H ohfeldian powers, they exist 
betw een the executor and the beneficiaries, or between the executor and fund-ho lders, 
or between the beneficiaries and the executor, and so on. There are also rights, 
duties, immunities, liberties and disabilities which are independent o f the term s o f any 
will. There may indeed even be terms deem ed to be incorporated in the will which 
the testator may not have contemplated. For example the Succession (Scotland) Act 
1964 provides:
"Every testamentary disposition executed after the commencement o f this A ct by
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which provision is made in favour o f the spouse or o f any issue o f the testator 
and which does not contain a declaration that the provision so made is in full 
and final satisfaction o f the right to any share in the testator’s estate to which 
the spouse or the issue, as the case may be, is entitled by virtue o f ju s  relicti, 
ju s  relictae or legitim , shall (unless the disposition contains an express provision 
to the contrary) have effect as if  it contained such a declaration." 78
The conclusion to be draw n from  this extended digression into H art’s usage o f the 
term  ’power’ in The Concept o f  Law  is that although H art may be given considerable 
credit fo r having accentuated the distinction between duty-im posing and 
pow er-conferring rules, an essentially similar distinction had already been 
acknowledged by H ohfeld, and indeed, such was the im portance o f the distinction to 
Kocourek that he asserted that there are only two ultimate ju ra l relations:
"According to the above table [of jural relations], there appear to be four 
fundam ental types o f jural relation, but a closer exam ination o f the m atter 
shows that there are in fact only two fundam ental types -  claims and powers." 79
It is worth noting that analyses of legal powers have not, by any means, been confined  
to tw entieth century jurisprudential writing, for, as H art points out in his later work 
Essays on Bentham , 80 Bentham had anticipated m uch of H ohfeld’s work in his 
analyses o f rights and powers in his juristic treatise, O f Laws in General. 81 Perhaps 
we should also note the apologia which H art offers fo r what he describes as his 
’previous inadequate approach’ to the subject o f legal powers in The Concept o f  Law. 
According to H art, he (Hart) made no attem pt in The Concept o f  Law  to analyse 
closely either the notion o f a power or the structure o f the rules by which powers are 
conferred. 82
We shall return  to the distinction between rights and powers later, but in the m eantim e 
it is helpful to continue discussion of three notions which play an im portant part in 
H ohfeld’s scheme o f ju ral relations: the first is the notion o f ju ra l correlativity (which 
has already been discussed at some length); the second is the notion o f ju ra l opposition
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or jural contradiction; and the third is the notion of jural negativity  (that is, the utility, 
or otherwise, o f terms such as ’no-righ t’).
Dealing first w ith the notion o f ju ral correlativity, Glanville Williams in the eleventh 
edition o f Salm ond on Jurisprudence observes that the question w hether rights and 
duties are necessarily correlative has resolved itself into two schools o f thought 
according to one o f which there can be no right without a corresponding duty , or duty 
without a corresponding right "any more than there can be a husband w ithout a wife, 
or a father without a child". 83
"For, on this view, every duty must be a duty towards some person or persons, 
in whom therefore, a correlative right is vested. And conversely every right 
must be a right against some person or persons, upon whom, therefore, a 
correlative duty is imposed. Every right or duty involves a vinculum juris  or 
bond of legal obligation, by which two or more persons are bound together. 
There can therefore be no duty unless there is some one to whom it is due; there 
can be no right unless there is some one from  whom it is claimed; and there can 
be no wrong unless there is some one who is wronged, that is to say, whose 
right has been violated." 84
The other school o f thought does not deny the correlativity o f m any rights or duties, 
or types o f right or duty, but distinguishes between correlative rights or duties (termed 
relative rights and duties) and rights and duties which are term ed absolute. Absolute 
rights in this sense have no duties corresponding to them , and absolute duties similarly 
have no rights corresponding to them. According to Williams, the dispute between the 
two schools is a typical example o f a ’verbal controversy’ which is devoid o f practical 
consequences. 85 The point Williams appears to be making is that the dispute between 
the two schools probably depends more upon how the words ’right* or ’duty’ are used 
in a particular context or are defined for purposes of that context than upon the 
existence o f any principled difference between relative rights (duties) and absolute 
rights (duties).
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But it is d ifficu lt simply to dismiss the argum ent between the schools on the ground of 
an apparent semantic disagreement w ithout entertaining at least a suspicion that there 
may be a substantive disagreement between them , the elucidation o f which m ight aid 
our understanding of rights and duties in general. Despite this, there is a natural 
inclination, on the one hand, to conceive o f rights as, fo r example, the ’protected’ 
expectation or claim or demand which one person (or persona) has against or in a 
question with another person (or persona). On the other hand, it is d ifficu lt to think 
o f duties other than as that which one person (or persona) ought to, or m ust, do in a 
question with another person (or persona).
These inclinations, it must be said, have their origins in the recognition o f the intrinsic 
relationality o f social action in terms o f which social action is conceived as 
alter-oriented activity. This in tu rn  is reflected in the structure o f the social norm . It 
therefore seems difficult to visualise a social right inherent in or social du ty  incident 
to someone (whether ’natural’ or ’jurid ical’) that does not avail against some other 
person (whether ’natural’ or ’jurid ical’). This is a concom itant o f the whole conceptual 
and theoretical apparatus underlying the concept o f the ’social’. It may be that 
arguments favouring a concept o f absolute rights or duties may turn  less on the denial 
of the possibility that such rights and duties avail against ’another’ than on the 
determinacy (or indeterminacy) o f the ’other’ against whom they avail.
The fact that there is probably no-one in particular against whom I m ight assert a 
social right ’to life’ does not underm ine the fact that in asserting such a righ t in 
relevant circumstances I am at least conscious o f the fact that such an assertion would 
be completely meaningless were it not for the existence o f ’others* (possibly m ultitudes
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of indeterm inate ’others’) who are, m inim ally, rational and intelligent beings, m ore or 
less capable o f appreciating the im plications o f such an assertion albeit vague and 
imprecise. The fact o f making such an appeal involves a presupposition on my part, 
possibly banal, of the ’social nature* o f these other beings, and that they are capable o f 
responding to, or at least recognising the social meaning of, my appeal.
It may then be the lack of determ inacy in the sense o f d ifficulty  o f ascertainm ent o f 
’others* against whom absolute rights or duties may avail that lends support to the 
school o f thought that argues for the possibility o f a concept of the absolute righ t or 
duty. M ere lack o f determinacy, however, should not lead us to deny what appears to 
be an unavoidable consequence o f the social dimension o f social rights and social 
duties. This social dimension necessarily entails that the rights or duties in question 
avail against one or more individuals, other than respectively the righ t-ho lder or 
du ty-bearer. It cannot therefore be m aintained that lack of determ inacy o f such 
’others’ means no-one at all. It m ay indeed be d ifficu lt to ascertain the specific 
individual (or more broadly, personae) or class o f individuals (or personae) against 
whom a social right or duty avails, bu t ’d ifficu lty’ should not be taken to mean 
’impossibility*.
Furtherm ore, we should note that in  the legal context the problem of identify ing a 
party  who is ’correlative to’ the holder o f an absolute legal right or bearer o f an 
absolute legal duty may in some cases arise from  a failure to visualise the righ t or du ty  
in question in its ’crystallised’ form  in the sense discussed previously, that is, on the 
occurrence of appropriate ’operative facts*. In such a case, an ’uncrystallised* righ t or 
duty merely exists as an indeterm inate hypothesis.
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The problem of indeterm inacy also arises naturally in the context o f H ohfeld’s 
distinction between ’paucital’ and ’m ultital’ rights, 86 corresponding to the distinction 
between rights in personam  and rights in rem. The apparent lack o f determ inacy in 
the case o f rights in rem  leads Kocourek to identify  ’polarity’ as the root o f the 
distinction. A right in rem  is therefore classified as an ’unpolarized’ right while a 
right in personam  is seen as a ’polarized’ right. 87
Hohfeld’s ’num erical’ test is convincingly rejected by A.M. Honore 88 who argues in 
effect that the num ber o f persons subject to a legal duty (corresponding to a right in 
rem) is irrelevant to the essential character o f the right in rem. Polarity also seems 
doubtful as a basis o f the distinction given that on the ’crystallisation’ o f a right, 
whether it be in rem  or in personam , there will almost certainly be, on the one hand, 
an identifiable persona o f incidence and an identifiable persona o f inherence.
The most perceptive account o f the nature o f the distinction between rights in rem  and 
rights in personam  seems to have been offered by A.H. Campbell 89 who examines the 
competing accounts put forw ard by Hohfeld and Kocourek. As Campbell puts it,
"Hohfeld appears to have overlooked an im portant point. Even if  we agree that 
it is better to speak o f several rights correlative to several duties, what we call a 
right in rem  is not just one which happens to coincide with many other rights o f 
sim ilar content against other persons. A right in rem  is presumed to exist against 
’all the world’, and therefore against any particular defendant unless he can 
prove the contrary; a right in personam  has to be proved to exist against the 
particular defendant.” 90
Although Campbell seems to imply that the essential distinction lies in adjective legal 
norms which determ ine what must be proved in order to substantiate a right in rem , 
the real distinction in fact lies in his assertion that there is a presumption that the right
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avails against ’all the world’. To be more precise, the right in rem  is presumed  to avail 
against the category o f legal personae being the ’universe’ o f legal personae (both 
’natural’ and ’ju rid ica l’) w ith the obvious exception o f the righ t-ho lder him self and 
any other legal personae specifically excluded from that category on legal grounds.
Hohfeld’s distinction concludes this b rief discussion o f ju ra l correlativity . The two 
rem aining notions which are central to Hohfeld’s scheme o f ju ra l relations are those of 
ju ral opposition or contradiction, and of jural negativity.
H ohfeld uses the term  ’jural opposite’ to denote a term  which is the negative of 
another term. This yields two jural correlatives: the ’negative’ ju ra l relation of 
no-righ t-priv ilege (i.e. the ’jural opposite’ in the right stricto sensu fam ily of 
relations) and the ’negative’ jural relation o f disability-im m unity  (i.e. the ’jural 
opposite’ in the power fam ily of relations). Max R adin, 91 and G lanville Williams 
both refer to H ohfeld’s ju ra l ’opposites’ as ju ral ’contradictories’. As Williams says,
"...what Hohfeld called opposites...can better be called contradictories, because 
taken together they exhaust the relevant field (universe o f discourse). For 
example, a no -righ t means the absence of a right. E ither A has a righ t in a 
particular respect or he has no right (a no-right); there is no th ird  possibility." 92
At first sight, Williams’ rem ark seems obvious, but seems less so on reflection when we
consider that the concept o f the no-right has been criticised on the ground that there
is conceivably nothing to prevent a no-right from being an elephant(\) The point here
is that a no-righ t is capable of being anything that is not a right: a dog, a bookcase, a
piece o f musical notation or an electromagnetic force. Presum ably this criticism , by
extension, could be directed at the notion o f the no-pow er (i.e. d isability  9S).
Against this criticism , Williams argues that negative terms are o ften  useful as
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alternative ways of stating propositions involving negatives: "For instance, the term s 
’alien’, ’cold’ and ’dark’ are all negative or privative, because their meaning includes 
the idea of absence o f something else.” 94
Persuasive though it is, however, Williams’ counter-argum ent overlooks a more 
im portant principle underlying the use o f term inology such as no -righ t and m oreover, 
underlying the endeavours o f theorists such as H ohfeld who have accentuated the role 
o f legal concepts such as the no-righ t, or fo r that m atter no-du ty  or liberty  not, 
no-pow er or disability, and no-liability  or im m unity. It is that terms such as no -righ t 
(or no-duty , or no-pow er or no-liability) are not sim ply  useful terms which denote an 
absence of something. They are more than m erely useful negative terms. They are, 
rather, terms which denote 'relational situations’ which may be in their own right 
(positively) endowed with legal significance. Thus, in general term s, when we speak 
of (for example) a no-right -  no-du ty  (liberty not) ’situation’ we are not referring  to 
an absence of a relationship simpliciter. We are instead referring to an absence o f  a 
relationship in which, in the context of the specific ’situation’ envisaged, and only in 
that context, there are good reasons for attributing particular legal significance to that 
absence. A no-right is therefore intelligible in a context in which the absence o f the 
right is, in specified circumstances, o f some importance. It is likewise in the case o f 
the no-duty  (liberty not or privilege), no-pow er (disability) and no-liab ility  
(immunity).
It is possible to imagine two types of case though there are doubtless others, in which 
a ’negative relationship’, which is, after all, an absence o f a relationship, m ay be 
intelligible as a ’relationship’ by reason o f the significance attributed to the absence o f 
a ’positive relationship’.
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First, there is the case where the absence o f a legal relationship for example, a 
r ig h t-d u ty  relationship gives someone grounds (e.g.) fo r negotiating a legal relationship 
betw een himself and someone else. For instance, it may be that between A and B 
there is no contractual relationship o f any kind and A wishes (for example) to acquire 
som ething, say, a car, from B. If  we assume that B is willing to sell his car, A may 
wish to enter into negotiations with B fo r the purchase of the car such that any 
relationship established between A and B receives the benefit of legal recognition, 
provided, o f course, that certain conditions are m et, i.e. ’operative* conditions.
In a case such as this, it may be o f some im portance to A and B (or at any rate to A) 
that, prior to contracting, no legally recognised relationship exists between them , and 
it may even be a m atter of considerable significance to A that, before entering into 
negotiations with B, he conceives of his situation in relation to B as one in which he 
(A) has no right (or a *no-right’) that B should ’surrender’ his car to A. The no -righ t 
-  no -du ty  ’situation’ which A and B find themselves in may well furnish them  w ith a 
pretex t for seeking to ’regularise’ the situation by entering into a contract.
The second case is where the absence in  question (i.e. a ’negative relationship’ in the 
H ohfeldian sense) constitutes an exception to a ’positive relationship*, and thereby 
partially  determines the scope of the ’positive relationship*.
For example, under circumstances n, A may have a right in a question w ith B that B 
shall 0, provided that A is not less than 18 years o f age. If  A is concerned to know 
w hether he has a right in a question w ith B under circumstances n he m ust establish 
w hether in terms of his status he falls w ithin the proviso to the rule. The point here
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is that it may be im portant for A, and indeed for B, to rule out potential 
’no -righ t-ho lders’ such as A himself if, for example, A is 15 years o f age by m aking 
reference to the appropriate proviso. A and B may furtherm ore wish to rule out 
potential ’no -du ty -bearers’ such as B, if  A indeed happens to be only 15 years o f . age. 
By this means, A will be able to establish w hether the rule applies to the effect o f 
conferring a right upon him , and therefore a duty upon B. M oreover by examining 
the proviso to the rule (and considering the possible no -righ t -  no -d u ty  ’situations’) A 
may confidently  assert that the rule confers a right only upon A ’s who are aged at 
least 18 years, and imposes a duty only upon B’s if  the A ’s in question satisfy the 
appropriate age criterion. A is thus able to determ ine the scope o f the right by 
reference to a no -righ t which constitutes an exception to the right.
We should also note that a right may be m eaningfully delim ited through the expedient 
o f an exception to a no-right. To give a statutory example, section 4(1) o f the Law 
R eform  (M iscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 provides inter alia  that:
"...A landlord shall not, for the purpose o f treating a lease as term inated ...be 
entitled  to rely ...on a provision in the lease which purports to term inate it, or to 
enable him  to term inate it, in the event o f a failure o f the tenant to pay ren t, or 
to m ake any other payment, on or before the due date therefor...11 [unless the 
landlord has served upon the tenant a notice in prescribed form  requiring 
paym ent to be made]. 95
It can readily be seen that in an ’Hohfeldian situation’ such as tha t envisaged in this 
example, a landlord would ordinarily have a right in a question with a tenant to 
term inate a lease without notice, if  the lease so provided. Indeed the lease may 
provide fo r automatic term ination merely by virtue o f the occurrence o f a term inative 
event.
Now the crucial feature of section 4 is that the landlord’s righ t to term inate is
62
conceived as a ’blanket’ no-right subject to an exception in the case o f determ ination 
effected by the prescribed form of notice. But why does the Act adopt this legislative 
strategy rather than, for example, define the right in question by means o f (positive) 
rights terminology?
The answer to this is that it is perhaps legislatively expedient and (what is more 
im portant) legally necessary to define, or re-create the landlord’s right as an exception 
to a no -righ t precisely because any provision in the lease which is at variance with the 
statutory provision m ust first be negated. However the A ct does not actually nullify 
the provisions o f the lease, for the lease m ight well establish a procedure for 
term ination which is fully in accordance with the statutory procedure or be even more 
favourable from  the tenant’s point of view. In that case, the lease provisions would 
prevail.
The Act, rather, in effect negates any rights the landlord m ay have under the lease to 
the extent that the lease fails to provide for term ination by means o f notice in the 
prescribed form . The landlord is therefore deprived o f his righ t (i.e. he has a 
’no-righ t’) to term inate the lease in accordance w ith the term s thereof unless the notice 
form alities are complied with. Only in that event does he have the right to term inate. 
The point here is that but for the statutory provision, the landlord would have a right 
to term inate in accordance with the terms of the lease, and it is therefore necessary to 
make unambiguous counter-provision against the contractual term s. In a sense, the 
statutory provision ’derogates’ from  the realm of no -righ t into the realm o f right, but 
the relationship between landlord and tenant must first be conceived as a no -righ t in 
order m eaningfully to establish the boundaries o f the (positive) right.
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This concludes our brief consideration of H ohfeld’s scheme of ju ra l relations. It is 
convenient now to consider from  a W eberian sociological perspective the element of 
social power which we will argue resides in the ju ral relation. This will be an 
appropriate introduction to our discussion at the end of this chapter o f the Hohfeldian 
legal power. For it is as relationships o f social power that the conceptual proxim ity of 
the legal right stricto sensu and the legal power can readily be seen.
V.5 The Jural Relation as a Relationship of Social Power
It may be recalled from  earlier discussion that in his Sociology o f  Law  Weber discusses 
the manifestations in ordinary legal relationships of legitim ate authority  or superiority, 
term ed ’H errschaft\ which has traditionally been translated as ’dom ination’. 96 
According to Weber, ’dom ination’ as a species o f social power in  the w ider sense, is 
m anifested in legal relationships in that rights (or ’claims’, as Weber’s translators 
occasionally call them) which the law grants to one person in a question with one or 
more others may be conceived as powers to ’issue commands’ to the other or others in 
question. As Weber him self puts it:
"Domination in the quite general sense o f power, i.e., o f the possibility o f 
imposing one’s will upon the behavior o f other persons, can emerge in the most 
diverse forms. If, as has occasionally been done, one looks upon the claims 
which the law accords to one person against one or more others as a power to 
issue commands to such others or to those to whom no such claim is accorded, 
one may thereby conceive o f the whole system of m odern private law as the 
decentralization of dom ination in the hands of those to whom the legal rights are 
accorded. From this angle, the worker would have the power to comm and, i.e., 
’domination’, over the entrepreneur to the extent of his claim for wages..." 97
Weber, however, stresses the distinction between ’commands’ directed  by the judicial
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authority  to an adjudged debtor and ’commands’ directed by the claim ant him self to a 
debtor prior to judgment. 98 In essence, Weber appears to recognise here the 
distinction between a substantive legal relationship (such as that w hich would subsist 
betw een, fo r example, litigating parties), and an adjective legal relationship (such as 
that which would subsist between, fo r example, a tribunal and litigating parties). Both 
relationships are relationships o f social power but clearly d iffer both in term s o f 
context and content. At the level o f content we have earlier noted that the adjective 
legal relationship ’subsumes’ the substantive relationship in certain cases.
Weber offers several prim ary definitions o f the concept of ’dom ination’ (H errschaft), 
and also offers a definition of the w ider concept of ’power’ {Macht). Thus in Economy 
and Society  he furnishes what appear to be competing definitions. One defin ition
stresses the de facto  or causal elem ent o f social power, expressed in  term s o f
probability:
"’Power’ {Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will 
be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless o f the 
basis on which this probability rests. ...’Domination* {Herrschaft) is the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a 
given group of persons. ...The concept of power is sociologically am orphous.
All conceivable qualities o f a person and all conceivable com binations o f
circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation. 
The sociological concept o f dom ination must hence be more precise and can only 
mean the probability that a command  will be obeyed." 99
A d iffe ren t definition, appearing in A ppendix I of Economy and Society , 100 tends 
towards a more Verstehende’ notion o f  power and lends weight to A lan H unt’s 
characterisation of power in the Weberian sense as a relational concept, concerned as it 
is w ith the impact of one person upon another in so far as the behaviour o f  the one 
may be analysed as having been determ ined by the other. 101 W eber’s alternative 
defin ition  o f Herrschaft is as follows:-
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"Herrschaft (domination) does not mean that a superior elem entary force asserts 
itself in one way or another; it refers to a m eaningful interrelationship between 
those giving orders and those obeying, to the effect that the expectations toward 
which action is oriented on both sides can be reckoned upon...H 102
G uenther Roth in a footnote to Economy and Society  108 takes this notion of 
relationality fu rther by characterising Herrschaft in the sociological sense as a 
"structure o f superordination and subordination, o f leaders and led, rulers and ruled". 
This has special importance because superordination and subordination are m utually 
dependent and correlative notions. If A is superordinate to B, then B is subordinate to 
A; if  B is subordinate to A then A is superordinate to B.
Georg Simmel also presents superordination and subordination as relational concepts. 
Such relationships are to be found specifically in the context o f social interaction. 
According to Simmel, even the absolute despot interacts socially w ithin a context o f 
superordination and subordination. In Simmel’s view, if  the despot "...accompanies his 
orders by the threat o f punishm ent or the promise o f rew ard, this implies that he 
him self wishes to be bound by the decrees he issues. The subordinate is expected to 
have the right to request something o f him; and by establishing the punishm ent, no 
m atter how horrible, the despot commits him self not to impose a more severe one." 104 
The point here, as Simmel goes on to say, is that provided there is spontaneity  w ithin 
the relationship, that is, some element o f freedom , the parties are in a m eaningful 
sense interacting socially. As Simmel observes:
"...although the superordinate wholly determines the subordinate, the subordinate 
nevertheless is assured of a claim on which he can insist or which he can waive. 
Thus even this extreme form  of the relationship still contains some sort o f 
spontaneity on his part." 105
The ultim ate denial o f the social and o f the interactional is to be found in a
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relationship o f superordination in which the group "simply disposes of its members". 
This must surely be the ’purest* case of power de facto  and completely negates any 
possibility o f m eaningful interaction. 106
In the context of legal authority, Weber’s concept o f superiority or ’dom ination’ has 
resonances both o f relationality, and, more intriguingly still, o f correlativity in the 
H ohfeldian sense. Domination in this context is identical to authoritarian power of 
command, according to Weber. 107 ’Domination’, then, comes to mean the situation in 
which:
"The m anifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is m eant to influence the 
conduct o f one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such 
a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if  the ruled had 
made the content o f the command the maxim o f their conduct for its very own 
sake. Looked upon from  the other end, this situation will be called 
o b e d ie n c e 108
It is clear from  the observations which follow this rem ark that Weber is not necessarily 
referring to a situation o f ’rule’ as ’governance’ in the sense of, fo r example, 
democracy, m onarchy or oligarchy. It is apparent that ’dom ination’ o f this kind can 
be m anifested in simpler and more modestly scaled situations. Weber gives the 
example o f officials in d ifferen t departments o f m odern bureaucracies where each is 
subject to the others’ powers o f command in so far as the latter have jurisdiction. 109 
He even considers such a ’command structure’ to be present where a custom er places 
w ith a shoemaker an order for a pair of shoes. 110 Thus, given the scope o f Weber’s 
concept of ’dom ination’ or ’Herrschaft’, it can come as no surprise that this provides 
theoretical underpinning to Weber’s sociological conceptualisation o f the legal right. 
This is to be seen in the passage quoted earlier. 111
There are two passages in particular in Economy and Society  (both o f which are also in
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the Sociology o f  Law) in which Weber, in a sense, synthesises the defining sociological 
elements o f the legal right. In those passages Weber defines the concept of the right 
in terms which serve to accentuate the elem ent o f social power inherent in the legal 
right, i.e. the ’invocation’ o f a ’coercive apparatus’. The defin ition  also stresses 
relationality and correlativity in the legal righ t-du ty  relationship conceived as a 
relation o f social power, and finally, recalling earlier discussion, emphasises the 
expectational-obligational element o f the legal relationship. In the firs t passage, Weber 
presents a basic sociological definition o f a right.
"Sociologically, the statement that someone has a right by virtue o f the legal 
order of the state thus normally means the following: He has a chance, factually 
guaranteed to him by the consensually accepted interpretation o f a legal norm, 
of invoking in favor o f his ideal or material interests the aid o f  a ’coercive 
apparatus’ which is in special readiness for this purpose. This aid consists, at 
least normally, in the readiness o f certain persons to come to his support in the 
event that they are approached in the proper way, and that it is shown that the 
recourse to such aid is actually guaranteed to him by a ’legal norm ’". 112
The next passage stresses the ’duty’ or ’obligation’ aspect of a relationship and does not 
specifically mention the legal right, bu t it is clear that the righ t-du ty  legal relationship 
is the subject of discussion. In order to accentuate in the following passage the 
relationality of the situation described by Weber, it is helpful fo r references 
respectively to the person of inherence or right-holder and person o f incidence or 
du ty-bearer (’A’ and ’B’) to be inserted w ithin square brackets in the text, thus:
"The fact that a person ’owes’ something to another can be translated, 
sociologically, into the following terms: a certain comm itm ent (through promise, 
tort or other cause) of one person [B] to another [A]; the expectation [of A], 
based thereon, that in due course the form er [B] will yield to the latter [A] his 
right o f disposition over the goods concerned; the existence o f a chance that this 
expectation will be fulfilled." 113
A t this stage, we should also note Weber’s definition of ’legal relationship’: "The term  
’legal relationship’ will be applied to designate that situation in which the content o f a
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right is constituted by a relationship, i.e., the actual or potential actions o f concrete 
persons or o f persons to be identified by concrete criteria." 114
In Weber’s sociological definition o f a legal right the element o f social pow er appears 
to lie more in the ’readiness’ o f a ’coercive apparatus’ to be mobilised in  favour o f  a 
righ t-holder’s ideal or m aterial interests than in any quality that attaches to the 
right-holder personally. Weber would doubtless have been aware that certain  potential 
right-holders (or duty-bearers) can possess enormous social power in the ir own righ t, 
whether economically or on account o f rank, status or other condition, and tha t this 
would be another dimension to be added to any ’calculus’ of social pow er obtain ing  
w ithin a relationship in a given case.
However, while Weber’s definition emphasises that the dimension o f social pow er 
within a legal relationship lies essentially in the availability o f a ’coercive apparatus’ to 
take enforcem ent action in appropriate circumstances, it seems paradoxical tha t W eber 
apparently adopts the point o f view, not o f the ’coercive apparatus’ or ’legal o rder’ bu t 
o f the right-holder. Thus it is the right-holder  who has a chance factually guaranteed  
to him  o f invoking in favour o f his ideal or material interests the aid o f  a ’coercive 
apparatus’.
But it is surely the case that where a right-holder invokes the aid o f a ’coercive 
apparatus’, the power both de facto  and de jure  resides, at least according to a 
rudim entary view, in the ’coercive apparatus’, rather than in the r ig h t-h o ld e r, 
otherwise the right-holder m ight conceivably dispense with the aid o f the  apparatus. 
Why then does Weber give prominence to the point o f view of the righ t-ho lder?
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It is arguable that by giving prominence to the righ t-holder’s perspective Weber may 
have overlooked that the ’legal relationship*, or more specifically, the ju ral relation, 
obtaining between a right-holder and du ty-bearer must ideally be conceived from  the 
point o f view of one or more individuals who possess and exercise a more significant 
degree o f social power than the righ t-holder or du ty -bearer. That is, a legal 
relationship must be conceived from  the perspective o f the legal institution 
(represented in the present analysis by the type-construct Iudex) i f  and only if  the 
investigator is concerned with exercises o f social power ’measured’ in term s o f degree 
or significance. Furtherm ore, any relationship so conceived must be tested against a 
criterion o f validity. This establishes the legitimacy o f the legal institution’s coercively 
guaranteed power to give effect, by enforcem ent action, to a righ t-ho lder’s ideal or 
m aterial interests.
The dimension o f legal social power inherent in the notion o f coercive guarantee must 
be isolated from  other dimensions o f social power existing within a legally protected 
righ t-du ty  relationship, such as for example ’personal authority* o f a righ t-ho lder and 
’deference* o f a duty-bearer. By this means the legal coercive dim ension is seen to be 
a significant force in its own right, giving support to superordination-subordination 
relationships of social power consisting in measurable probabilities that ’commands’ 
w ith a given content will be ’obeyed’ by certain groups o f persons. The factual 
dimension o f social power, then, consists in that it is not m erely the ’obedience’ o f 
litigants that can be relied upon for the execution o f the valid judgm ent o f a court o f 
law. If  that were the case it may be impossible for Weber’s em pirical probability o f 
’obedience’ to be established.
O f course, the ’obedience’ in question may refer to that o f litigants who are prepared
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to accept an adverse court decision. But ’obedience’ m ust presum ably also refer to 
that o f the personnel of a coercive legal order who execute judgm ents o f the court. 
A n offic ia l’s motive for rendering ’obedience* would doubtless d iffe r  from  that of a 
litigant (even an ’obedient* litigant who has been the subject o f an adverse judgment).
Despite his apparent adoption of the point o f view o f the righ t-ho lder in his 
sociological definition of legal right, Weber’s conception o f the im portance o f adopting 
the theoretical perspective of a position-occupant endowed with social power is given 
unam biguous expression in his characterisation o f the sociological point o f view. In 
this context the investigator’s concern is to discover w hat actually happens in a group 
owing to the probability that persons engaged in social action (e.g. judges), "especially 
those exerting a socially relevant amount o f  power" subjectively consider certain norms 
as valid and orient their conduct by reference to those norms. 115
This may be taken as an exhortation to focus sociological attention on an actual or 
hypothetical position-occupant, and one, m oreover, possessing ’social power* in the 
sense discussed, who conceives legal rights or legal duties as obtaining between legal 
personae. It would surely be a mistake to make the legal personae themselves or any 
one o f them , e.g. the right-holder, the focus o f attention.
This m uch has been argued already at various points in the preceding discussion as a 
justification  fo r adopting the perspective o f Iudex. Iudex  is seen as a possessor of 
significant social power by virtue of office. He conceives rights, duties, powers and 
liabilities as obtaining between actual, potential or hypothetical litigants or other legal 
personae. Furtherm ore, according to this theoretical perspective, certain  courses of 
social action can to an empirically determ inable extent be relied upon to be perform ed
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in response to the judgm ent or other official act o f Iudex. O ften such perform ance is 
wholly independent o f the volition o f litigants, and this must render all the more 
remarkable any theoretical stance in which precedence is accorded to the perspective 
o f the litigant qua right-holder or du ty -bearer. Such a perspective m ay, o f  course, be 
unobjectionable in an investigation which is not, or is only m arginally, concerned to 
attach sociological significance to the ram ifications o f exercises o f social power. But 
an individual litigant’s perspective may well be unobjectionable even in the context o f 
a sociological investigation of the consequences o f power-exercises i f  the litigant in 
question, for example, a m ultinational corporation, happens to possess dem onstrable 
attributions o f social power.
Often the existence or non-existence o f instances o f social power depends on the 
extent to which (if at all) an individual perceives an exercise o f power to be e ither 
inherently ’legitimate’, or ’legitimate’ by virtue o f the office, status or position o f the 
individual exercising the power. In an illum inating discussion o f ’legitim acy’ in  a 
context of social power, sociologist H erbert C. Kelm an 116 gives an account o f various 
ways in which a ’pow er-target’ may come to accept, and therefore to act upon w ithout 
challenge, a ’legitimate* request, command or order of a ’power-source*. The 
subjective meaning of such ’acceptance’ in this context perhaps corresponds to W eber’s 
notion of ’obedience*, which, it will be recalled, exists in a situation in w hich the 
action of the person obeying follows such a course that the content o f the com m and 
may be taken to have become the basis o f action fo r its own sake. 117 F urtherm ore, 
and crucially, ’obedience* is rendered "without regard to the actor’s own a ttitude  to the 
value or lack of value of the content o f the command as such."
Against this background Iudex  may be postulated as a ’pow er-source’, and e ither, on
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the one hand, litigants, or on the other hand, enforcem ent personnel, m ay be 
postulated as ’pow er-targets’. The enforcem ent personnel o f a legal order are expected 
to render ’obedience’ to the judgm ent o f a court ju st as are litigants, although the 
’obedience’ rendered by such personnel is intrinsically o f a d ifferen t nature linked as it 
is w ith the execution of an official function. However distanced individual litigants 
may be from  the exigencies o f litigation in a given case, they nevertheless have a 
personal interest in the outcome of the case, and this is surely reflected in the nature 
of the ’obedience’ they are bound to render, and in the ’perform ance acts’ required  o f 
them , in satisfaction o f an order o f the court.
We might also note at this stage that in the usual case a judge does not stand 
exclusively in superordinate relationships w ith others. Normally he stands in a 
relationship o f subordination to the impersonal legal order in which he holds office. 
He may not ’owe obedience’ to any individual in particular, but may nevertheless ’owe 
obedience’ to identifiable individuals o f a given class.
Returning to Kelm an’s analysis, then, social power or social influence refers to socially 
induced behaviour change. Social influence occurs whenever a person (P) changes his 
behaviour as a result of induction by another person or group, the influencing agent or
0. 118 Induction occurs whenever 0 offers or makes available to P some k ind o f 
behaviour and communicates something about the probable effects o f adopting that 
behaviour. Induction may involve persuading, ordering, threatening, ’expecting* or 
providing guidelines. 119 From this fundam ental starting point, Kelm an turns to 
consider influence under conditions o f legitimate authority. 120
In Kelm an’s view, situations o f legitimate influence are distinctive in th a t the
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influencing agent 0 is perceived as having the right to exert influence and to make 
demands by virtue o f his position in the social system. 121 For present purposes a 
judge, such as Iudex , may be considered to be an influencing agent such as Kelman 
envisages. According to Kelman, once a demand o f the influencing agent is 
categorised as ’legitim ate’, the ’pow er-target’ P finds h im self in a situation in which 
his preferences are more or less irrelevant for determ ining his actions. 122 Ordinarily, 0 
would have to convince P that adopting the induced behaviour is preferable for him, 
assigning to P a measure o f freedom of choice in pursuing a given course o f action. 
Thus:
"In situations o f legitimate influence, by contrast, 0 does not have to convince P 
that adopting the induced behavior is preferable fo r him , given the available 
alternatives, but merely that it is required of him." 123
The ability o f an influencing agent acting w ithin a given ’system’ to elicit desired 
responses is, in Kelm an’s view, dependent on the extent to which the system itself is 
perceived as legitimate. If  it is perceived as legitimate it m ay function  on a basis of 
consent, "with relatively little need to resort to coercion or to confront constant 
challenges." 124
In the course o f his discussion, Kelman postulates a model o f processes o f social 
influence which is o f interest in the present context. A lthough it is beyond the scope 
o f our present concern to give an exhaustive account o f this m odel in view of its 
com plexity, we should nevertheless note three modes o f  integration which Kelman 
outlines. These modes are indicative o f the basis upon which ’obedience’ m ight be 
rendered either by a litigant or by an enforcement official in response to an order o f a 
court. However, as we have noted earlier, there are d ifferences betw een the basis of 
’obedience’ in the case of each type of actor respectively. We should also be aware
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that Kelm an does not single out these types o f actors for specific treatm ent since his 
analysis deals generally with influence under conditions o f legitimate authority, not 
specifically w ith legal influence. But Kelm an’s model is instructive in its application 
to the present study.
The first mode o f integration in Kelm an’s analysis, then, is ideological integration. 
According to Kelman:
"An individual who is ideologically integrated is bound to the system by virtue 
of the fact that he subscribes to some o f the basic values on which the system is 
established. These may be the cultural values defining the national identity, or 
the social values reflected in the institutions by which the society is organized, 
or both." 125
Ideological integration entails that the individual internalises system values by 
incorporating them  into a personal value fram ew ork. By this means, any demand for 
behaviour supportive of the system is likely to be met w ith a positive response 
provided the demand is consistent with the underlying values o f  the system, and is 
therefore consistent with the values to which the individual has subscribed.
The second mode o f integration which Kelm an considers is role-participant 
integration.
"An individual who is integrated via ro le-participation is bound to the system by 
virtue o f the fact that he is personally engaged in roles w ithin the system -  roles 
that en ter significantly into his self-definition." 126
This mode o f integration may involve the individual in emotional or functional 
participation in a role which is central to his self-identity . I f  emotionally involved, he 
may be, in a sense, drawn into the symbolistic and possibly ritualistic trappings o f the 
role. If functionally involved, he may be responsible for the perform ance o f various
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roles considered necessary for m aintaining the system in existence. This may entail 
that the individual identify  with powerholders since he has a stake in m aintaining the 
system -related roles in which his self-defin ition  is anchored. His preparedness to 
respond positively to the system’s demands therefore has its origins in the fact that his 
role also demands this response.
The third mode o f integration is normative integration.
"An individual who is normatively integrated is bound to the system by virtue of 
the fact that he accepts the system’s right to set the behavior o f its members 
w ithin a prescribed domain." 127
According to Kelm an, this involves legitimacy in its ’pure form ’. In this context 
questions of personal values and roles are irrelevant. The individual m ay accept the 
system’s right to be rendered ’obedience’ based on his com m itm ent to, fo r example, 
the state as a sacred object in its own right, or on his com m itm ent, as K elm an puts it, 
to the necessity o f law and order as a guarantor o f equitable procedures. 128
The individual faced with demands to support the system is likely to com ply w ithout 
question provided he believes that the demands are ’authoritatively’ presented as the 
wishes of the leadership or the requirem ents o f law. In Kelm an’s view , an indication 
o f authoritativeness is the existence o f a positive or negative sanction to control proper 
performance.
The existence of a sanction with its connotations o f a coercive apparatus standing in 
readiness to take enforcem ent action places Kelm an’s third mode o f  in tegration firm ly 
in the realm of legal authority. But in varying degrees o f appropriateness, each of 
Kelman’s three modes o f integration is m anifested in the relationships o f social power
76
that exist at all levels in the legal context. Thus litigants may well, bu t need not 
necessarily, be ideologically integrated in the system although they do not participate 
in any of the system’s roles. It is likely, though, that an ideologically integrated 
litigant would also be norm atively integrated in the system, since norm ative integration 
is arguably a specific m anifestation of ideological integration. It seems d ifficu lt to 
imagine a normatively integrated individual accepting the system’s righ t to set norms 
o f behaviour for its participants while simultaneously rejecting the m ore general values 
whch are a prerequisite o f  allegiance to the system.
An individual holding an office or perform ing a specified function w ith in  the system, 
such as a judge or an enforcem ent official, is likely to be integrated in the system in 
all three of the senses envisaged by Kelman, though in differing degrees o f strength. 
Clearly, ro le-participant integration will be an im portant influence upon the behaviour 
o f an official, and to a lesser extent may influence the action o f a  litigant who 
perceives himself as a ’law -abiding citizen’. Such a litigant must, o f  course, subscribe 
to the value of ’law abidingness’ which may well be a particular m anifestation both o f 
ideological and norm ative integration.
If  any conclusion can be draw n from  this b rief discussion o f the ju ra l relation as a 
relation of social power, it is that for purposes of sociological theorising about the 
ju ra l relation the perspective should be adopted of a position-occupant (in the present 
context, Iudex) who exercises significant social power and whose conception o f the 
ju ra l relation obtaining between legal personae in a given case is the operative one for 
purposes of the mobilisation o f a coercive legal apparatus. But we m ust at the same 
time recognise that unless the system, specifically the legal order, is invested w ith 
’legitimacy’ and therefore attracts to a greater or lesser extent the w illing allegiance o f
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those subject to it, it can maintain itself in existence only by countless exercises of 
sheer coercion in response to perpetual challenge. A system of governance o f this type 
surely m aintains only a pretence o f ’true* social power, for as Anthony T. K ronm an 
has observed:
"In a word, the real strength o f the most im portant and lasting form s of 
dom ination depends on the ideas or beliefs o f the dom inated, and this is likely 
to seem puzzling to anyone used to thinking of ideas as relatively weak and 
fragile things compared with the robust reality o f physical force. How are we 
to explain the im portant role played by ideas in the creation and m aintenance of 
the strongest and most enduring power relationships?" 129
Thus a perspective such as that of Iudex  may be worthy of adoption fo r purposes of 
sociological theorisation only if  Iudex  stands in a position in which, in a factual sense, 
he truly exercises significant social power. This may well depend on the extent to 
which his authority is perceived as legitimate.
V.6 The H ohfeldian Legal Power
Sociologically, the conceptual proxim ity o f the ju ral relations o f r ig h t-d u ty  and 
pow er-liability  is to be found in the recognition that ju ral relations are relationships of 
social power in the broad sense that in a context of legal authority they are substantive 
legal relationships which constitute part o f the adjective legal relationships obtaining 
betw een a superordinate party (in the present context, Iudex) and a subordinate party  
(for example, a litigant). (We should be aware moreover that within the substantive 
relationship a state of superordination and subordination obtains, for exam ple, betw een 
righ t-ho lder and duty-bearer). But while this conceptual ’levelling’ o f K ocourek’s 
"two ultim ate jural relations", 130 can be sustained in a sociological reading o f  ju ra l 
relations, it is quite untenable in a jurid ica l analysis in which the distinction betw een
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the legal right stricto sensu and the legal power must be carefully examined. One 
theorist who appears to have subscribed to a jurid ica l ’levelling’ of legal rights and 
legal powers is George W. Goble. Writing in 1935, Goble asserted:
"The basic legal concept is power. All other legal concepts are derivatives o f
this one. ...All acts or omissions legally significant involve the exercise of 
1^1powers.
...R ight-duty  as a legal relation would therefore seem not to be basic, bu t a 
description of a certain sequential com bination o f pow er- liability relations. 
The entire legal phenomenon involved in a r ig h t-  duty  could be expressed by 
the use of the terms power and liability.n 132
A subsum ption argum ent such as this is probably misleading. The legal right stricto 
sensu and legal power are concepts which serve m anifestly d ifferen t functions but 
which, at the level o f practical application, do indeed, converge at certain points. This 
convergence, however, should not lead us to assume uncritically that the ’strict’ legal 
right and ’H ohfeldian’ (if not equally ’strict’!) legal power are conclusively equivalent 
and thus presumably also interchangeable. That there is, irrefutably, a ju rid ical 
distinction between these concepts has been adverted to at various points in earlier 
discussion. Indeed, the distinguishing features o f the legal power were briefly  outlined 
in chapter III. 133 It therefore seems appropriate to consider from  a jurid ical 
perspective the precise nature and structure o f legal powers and to d ifferen tia te  the 
legal power from  the legal right in the strict sense. The m ain points of convergence 
betw een the two generic concepts will become clear from  the discussion.
O ur starting point, then, is Roscoe Pound’s definition o f legal power. A ccording to 
Pound:
"A power is a legally recognized or conferred capacity o f creating, divesting, or 
altering rights, powers and privileges and so o f creating duties and liabilities. It 
has been called a capacity o f altering the sphere o f rights or ju ral relations o f
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persons, using these terms to mean rights in the broader sense." 154
Certain aspects o f Pound’s definition are reflected in the definition o f power suggested 
in the eleventh edition o f Salm ond on Jurisprudence. Here, power is defined as an 
"ability conferred upon a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that 
end, the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, either o f him self or of other 
persons". 135
What is clear from  these definitions is that a legal power is a capability o f some kind 
which enables ’alteration* or change to be effected by some means by the legal persona 
upon whom the power has been conferred. An understanding o f the jurid ical nature 
o f this legal capability must presum ably lie in an understanding o f the nature of the 
’change* that may be effected by virtue o f the power. In the light o f the definitions 
given above, at least three situations o f ’change* can be distinguished:
1. the alteration, by virtue o f the power, o f the incidence, scope, application or 
effect o f existing  legal rights or legal powers;
2. the extinction, by virtue o f the power, o f existing legal rights or legal powers;
3. the creation, by virtue o f the power, o f completely new legal rights or legal 
powers.
If, by definition, the legal power involves a situation in which ’alteration’ or ’change* 
occurs, a temporal dimension must o f necessity be introduced into the analytical fram e 
o f reference. For purposes o f discussion, this tem poral dim ension entails that the 
investigator should note any significant differences between the legal situation 
obtaining at a given time, T i, and that obtaining at a later tim e, T ii, in consequence o f
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the exercise o f a legal power at time Tii. More specifically, the investigator's concern 
will be to compare the legal position o f a given individual (e.g. legal persona  A) at 
time Tii with that at time Ti. In this context, legal persona A m ay be e ither a persona 
o f inherence or a persona o f incidence, or indeed anyone else whose legal position is 
affected by the power exercise.
This requirem ent that a legal power be 'exercised' focuses attention upon a crucial 
feature of the legal power. It is that in a context of legal power, no legally recognised 
’change’ o f any significance occurs unless the power in question is ’exerc ised \ The 
exercise of the legal power induces a 'change' in the legal situation o f  specified  legal 
personae. An unexercised legal power is merely a potential legal capacity , bu t it has 
no legal consequences per se in so far as it remains unexercised. I f  a pow er exercise 
occurs at time Tii, the investigator may attem pt to identify the category o f ’change* 
effected by virtue o f the power exercise in terms of one or m ore o f  the three 
categories outlined above, or any other practicable category. We should note that these 
categories should be taken as inferring the entire range of H ohfeldian concepts (e.g. 
im m unity, no-right, privilege, liberty- not, and so on) and not m erely the two ultim ate 
concepts of legal right stricto sensu and legal power. It follows, then , tha t the exercise 
of a legal power may, fo r example, cause a legal immunity to be extinguished or 
narrowed.
The ability of a power exercise to effectuate legal 'change* gives an ind ication  o f the 
purpose and utility o f power in a legal context. From the poin t o f  view  o f law 
creation, it is inconceivable that a legislator or judge could foresee and m ake provision 
fo r every combination o f circumstances considered worthy o f regulation by legal 
means. Hence, the law confers legislative powers upon governm ent m inisters and
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other officials. Furtherm ore, it is often expedient and desirable for a ’private 
individual’ to confer upon one or more other individuals a power to act on his behalf 
and to perform  certain functions defined by the power. The acts o f the individual so 
em powered, if  performed in the capacity o f ’agent*, may by a legal fiction be accorded 
legal recognition by being treated for legal purposes as the acts o f the ’principal*.
M any of the law’s aims can be facilitated o r fu lfilled  by the device o f investing an 
individual w ith a capacity to act, w ithin a defined sphere of com petence, to the effect 
o f creating, altering or extinguishing legal rights and duties, and other legal states or 
conditions. In this way, the pow er-holder has discretion to ’respond* to situations 
which confront him and to regulate or otherwise make appropriate legal provision for 
those situations as they arise.
But as we briefly  observed in chapter III, a power exercise cannot be accorded legal 
recognition unless it is valid in the sense that it is intra vires or ’conceptually w ith in’ 
the scope o f the power as defined in the enabling legal norm. It follows that a 
purported exercise of power which is ultra vires would not be recognised fo r the 
purpose o f giving effect to any ’change’ in the legal situation o f the parties affected  
by it or in relation to whom it is directed.
The notion that legal powers have a ’scope* suggests that in some sense they possess 
’conceptual boundaries’. It is, o f course, true o f legal powers that there is granted to 
the pow er-holder a range or spectrum of possible ’pow er-acts’ (i.e. a realm  o f possible 
exercises o f power), all o f which may qualify as valid in terms o f  the pow er-liab ility  
norm. Those ’power-acts’ which lie on the ’conceptual boundary’ may well require 
adjudication to determine whether they are valid or invalid in relation to the norm.
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R eturning to the previous discussion, then, if  legal ’change* occurs at time Tii by 
reason o f the exercise o f a legal power, what can be said about the nature o f that 
’change’? In other words, what is entailed by the three categories of ’change’ outlined 
earlier?
As expected, a prerequisite of the theoretical assessment o f legal ’change* by virtue o f 
a power exercise is the adoption (by the investigator) o f the perspective o f Iudex. To 
this end, an attem pt is made to ’visualise’ the legal e ffec t o f the power exercise which 
ex  hypothesis is treated as occurring at time Tii. Thus we hypothesise, according to 
the unique point o f view of Iudex , the legal position o f (say) legal persona B, such 
position being treated as having ’crystallised’ a t tim e T ii in consequence o f a power 
exercise by (say) legal persona A. We must assume fu rth e r that but for the power 
exercise at time Tii, the legal situation obtaining at tim e T i would continue to obtain.
If  the effect o f the power exercise (i.e. a ’primary* legal power) is to alter, extinguish 
or create another legal power (i.e. a ’secondary’ legal power) then strictly speaking 
this does not per se bring about any ’change* in the legal position of any legal persona. 
Certainly, if  we take, for example, the case o f a (prim ary) power exercise by which a 
new (secondary) legal power is created, this invests the pow er-holder only w ith a 
potential to effectuate ’change’ upon the exercise o f the conferred {secondary) pow er, 
presum ably at a still later time (e.g. Tiii or Tn). A pow er-conferring act (in exercise 
o f an existing power) is akin to a legislative act and there is in theory no lim it to the 
length of the chain o f authorisation by which legal pow er may be conferred upon an 
ultim ate pow er-holder. It is useful to note that in his study o f legal systems, Joseph 
Raz identifies the category of legal norms w hich confer legislative powers. He
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designates these norms ’PL-norm s’:
"[Norms conferring legislative powers, or PL-norm s]... are characterized by the 
fact that the reaction to the perform ance o f the norm -act is prescribed by other 
norms, but these do not exist when the PL-norm  is created; they are created by 
the norm -acts o f the PL -norm  themselves." 136
But if  a (prim ary) legal power, exercised so as to create another (i.e. secondary) legal 
power (e.g. a delegation o f ministerial functions), invests the (secondary) 
pow er-holder only with a potentiality  to effectuate legal ’change*, it follows that the 
converse will also be true. T hat is, the exercise o f a (prim ary) legal pow er to the 
effect o f divesting  a pow er-holder o f (secondary) legal power deprives the (sometime) 
pow er-holder o f the potential to effectuate ’change* if  he should purport to exercise 
the (secondary) power then divested.
M ore generally, the recognition that an unexercised legal power consists only in a 
potentiality  to bring about legal ’change* is reflected in H ohfeld’s analysis, in terms o f 
which ’power’ is correlated w ith ’liability*. ’Liability’ in the H ohfeldian sense has 
connotations o f ’likelihood’ or ’probability’, or, more specifically, o f
’susceptibility-of-being-subjected-to* a power exercise. This susceptibility becomes an 
actuality at the moment o f exercise of the power, fo r this is, in a sense, the moment 
o f ’crystallisation’ o f the power.
Crucially, though, from  the point of view of Iudex , ’crystallisation* in the sense 
envisaged here occurs at the moment when legal relationships other than pow er-liability  
relationships become fixed fo r legal purposes, for it is then and only then that
someone (or some legal persona) becomes subject to a legal duty  to act in a specified
m anner. Since, as we have already considered, an exercise o f (prim ary) pow er which 
m erely alters or extinguishes an existing (secondary) power, or creates a new
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(secondary) power, affects only a potentiality to bring about legal ’change’, the 
(secondary) legal power being a ’potentiality’ in this sense, it cannot be said that in 
such a case anyone is directly obligated to act in a specified m anner in consequence of 
the exercise o f the (primary) power.
It is only w hen in consequence o f the power exercise someone is d irectly  obligated  to 
act (or refrain  from  acting) by being subject to a legal duty  in  a  question with a 
righ t-holder that court intervention to compel that act (or forbearance) is competent. 
Hence, the fixing o f righ t-du ty  legal relationships is o f greater significance than the 
’fixing* o f pow er-liability  legal relationships since the latter m ust then  be exercised 
(and even exercised again until the occurrence o f an ultimate pow er exercise) in order 
to create the possibility o f a ’settled’ legal position in which one legal persona has a 
duty  to act in a specified manner in a question with another legal persona .
In a context o f legal power, then, the ultimate ’settled* legal situation is one in  which, 
by reason o f the exercise o f a legal power, a righ t-du ty  legal relationship  subsists 
between given legal personae, and one, moreover which is itself in  a state o f ’rest’. 
Indeed, for this reason, it might be arguable that of K ocourek’s ’two ultim ate jural 
relations’, the righ t-du ty  ju ral relation is the ’more ultim ate’(l)
As stated earlier, the exercise of a legal power may induce legal ’change* w hereby the 
incidence, scope, application or effect o f an existing  legal righ t m ay be altered. 
Furtherm ore, an existing legal right may be extinguished, and a wholly new  legal right 
created.
To make the discussion more concrete, let us imagine that an individual A has a legal
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power to impose a duty to 0 upon a class o f individuals (defined by the norm) under 
given circumstances, n. Let us imagine fu rther that upon the occurrence o f the 
appropriate operative circumstances, A in his discretion considers that individual B (a 
member o f the relevant class) should be obligated to 0, and accordingly exercises his 
power to that effect, by ordering him to 0. We m ight then say that A by virtue o f the 
exercise o f a  legal power under relevant circum stances, n, has a right in a question 
with B that B shall 0, and B has a duty in a question w ith A that B shall 0. The 
perform ative utterance "you are under arrest", when in appropriate circumstances it is 
followed by an act o f arrest is a more concrete rendition o f this example. Here the 
arresting party  exercises a power which confers upon him  a right in term s o f which 
the arrested party  is duty-bound to submit him self to the 'process’ o f being arrested.
We should, o f course, recognise that the exercise o f a power often does not vest in the 
pow er-holder a direct right against a liability-bearer (or du ty -bearer) that the latter 
should act in  a specified manner, i.e. in a question w ith the pow er-holder. If, fo r 
example, the pow er-holder (individual A) has a legal power to alter the term s o f a 
contractual relationship obtaining between individual B (a righ t-holder) and individual 
C (a du ty -bearer), individual B would be a liab ility -bearer in a question w ith A 
notw ithstanding that he is a right-holder in a question with C, and this would be true 
irrespective o f whether A affected B’s interests adversely or favourably.
It follows that C is also a liability-bearer in a question w ith A at the same tim e as he 
is a du ty -bearer in a question with B, and this holds w hether A affects C’s interests 
adversely or favourably. However, if  the legal power conferred upon A enables A 
(say) to extinguish B’s legal right in a question w ith C, then clearly if  A exercises his 
power to tha t effect, the righ t-duty  relationship between B and C will no longer
86
subsist, although a consequential relationship o f some kind may be established 
depending upon the terms o f exercise by A o f the legal power.
So in the light o f the preceding discussion, what structural elements m ight be 
suggested for a (prim ary) pow er-liability legal norm? As with the structural elements 
o f the (right-duty) social norm suggested in chapter III, the following suggested 
elements should not be treated as being exhaustive:
1. specification o f operative facts: i.e. generally any facts which condition the
operation o f the power;
2. identification criteria o f personae o f inherence: i.e. those having a legal
capability to act within a specified ’sphere o f competence’ to the effec t o f 
inducing ’change’ in the legal position o f other legal personae (and often  o f the 
personae o f inherence also);
3. identification criteria o f personae o f incidence: i.e. those having a liability to 
have their legal position ’changed’ by virtue o f an exercise o f legal power;
4. specification o f conditions under which the power may be ’exercised’: i.e. any
requirem ents which relate to the m anner o f exercise o f the power;
5. specification o f a ’sphere o f competence’ either to:
(a) alter the incidence, scope, application or effect o f existing legal rights or 
existing (secondary) legal powers; or
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(b) to extinguish existing legal rights or existing (secondary) legal powers; or
(c) to create completely new legal rights or new (secondary) legal powers.
Any (secondary) legal power, altered or created by virtue o f the (prim ary) legal power 
would have the same structure as that specified above. Furtherm ore, any legal righ t so 
altered or created would have the same structure as that specified in previous 
discussion.
The complexity of this structure is such that it is not possible to suggest a conceptually 
neat typical abstract form ulation o f the pow er-liability  legal norm , such as was 
suggested earlier for the righ t-du ty  legal norm. Nevertheless, cumbersom e as it may 
be, the following is an attem pt to incorporate all the elements set ou t above, and may 
hopefully serve to clarify the structure o f the pow er-liability  legal norm . Thus:
U nder circumstances n, A (a persona o f inherence) [or a m em ber o f a class of 
personae possessing defined characteristics] has a legal power in  a question w ith 
B (a persona o f incidence) [or B and C... etc.], the ’exercise’ o f which [in 
m anner x] may induce legal ’change* [within a specified ’sphere o f competence*] 
in the legal position of B [etc., and in certain cases, o f A also]. B [etc.] 
has/have a legal liability in a question w ith A to have h is/the ir legal position so 
’changed’.
While this may, for theoretical purposes, ’typify* a pow er-liability  norm  by expressing 
at length the elements o f the relationship obtaining between a pow er-holder and a 
liability-bearer, in practice it would be rare to find all these elements together in a 
legal norm as in the abstract form ulation suggested above. Many o f these elements 
would normally be left unexpressed. For instance, section 4 of the Trusts (Scotland) 
Act 1921 137 provides inter alia:
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"...In all trusts the trustees shall have power to do the following acts, where such 
acts are not at variance with the terms or purposes o f the trust...To sell the trust 
estate or any part thereof...
In this example, although a class o f personae o f inherence is specified (trustees), there 
is no specification o f any personae o f incidence. This may well be because it is 
expedient not to specify any such personae as it might unduly lim it the range o f 
parties ’in a question w ith whom’ the power may be exercised. For exam ple, is the 
power in a given case exercisable by a trustee in a question w ith a beneficiary , or in a 
question with the truster or parties transacting with the trustee? The answ er to this is 
probably that relationships between the trustee and all other ’interested parties’ are in 
appropriate circumstances governed by the pow er-liability legal norm  and by any 
rights or powers altered, created or extinguished in consequence o f the exercise o f that 
power. It would doubtless be impracticable to make specific reference to all o f  these 
personae of incidence (or any other such personae) in the pow er-liability  norm .
As it happens, the mode o f exercise of the power o f sale conferred by section 4 o f the 
Act is governed by section 6: "All powers o f sale conferred on trustees by the trust 
deed or by virtue o f this Act may be exercised either by public roup or private 
bargain... ." M ore often , the manner o f exercise may be, by im plication ra ther than 
express stipulation, at the discretion of the persona o f inherence.
The description o f the power act in section 4 ("to sell the trust estate") makes no 
reference to specific ’existing’ rights or powers which are ’changed’ by v irtue  o f the 
exercise of the power. This ’sphere o f competence’ leaves considerable scope fo r the 
persona of inherence, at his discretion and by implication, to execute any o f the power 
acts considered earlier. For example, by entering into a contract fo r the sale o f any
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part of the trust estate the trustee acts in a m anner that is creative o f com pletely new 
legal rights and duties.
Indeed, the ’sphere o f competence’ conferred by a pow er-liability  legal norm  m ay give 
the pow er-holder a capability to select personae o f incidence normally out o f a class o f 
such personae liable to be affected by the exercise o f power. The ’sphere o f 
competence’ may also endow the pow er-holder with discretion as to the m anner of 
exercise o f the power or as to the nature o f the (operative) circumstances that induce 
an exercise o f power. Thus, as a structural elem ent, the ’sphere o f com petence’ o f a 
power may well subsume other structural elements.
This b rief consideration o f the nature and structure o f the pow er-liability  legal norm 
concludes discussion in this chapter o f the two fundam ental ju ral relations. One last 
point should however be made. It is that while it is arguable that the notions 
discussed earlier in this chapter o f ju ra l opposition (or ju ra l contradiction) and o f ju ra l 
negativity apply, without any conceptual distortion, to the legal pow er, the notion o f 
ju ral correlativity is more d ifficu lt to accommodate unless a d istinction is draw n 
between ’exercised’ and ’unexercised’ legal powers. In the case o f ’unexercised’ legal 
powers, it would seem legally meaningless to postulate that an almost unfathom able 
num ber o f potential liability-bearers might be under a legal liability in a given case to 
have their legal position altered by a pow er-holder i f  the power were ’exercised’. Why 
should this be treated as a ’relationship* at all, let alone one possessing legal 
significance?
On the other hand, an ’exercise’ o f legal power (especially an ’ultimate* one w hich in 
some way alters or affects a legal righ t-du ty  relationship) can m eaningfully be said to
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give rise to a correlative legal relationship. This is perhaps because the ’exercise* o f 
the power ’crystallises* the pow er-liability  relationship in such a way that a 
’relationship* can be ascribed to identifiable parties.
With this in mind, it is appropriate now to consider a perspective from  w hich, fo r 
theoretical purposes, jural relations may be treated as being ascribed. The final 
chapter, as we have previously m entioned, considers the perspective o f the incum bent 
o f the ultimate judicial office, Iudex , and hopefully, draws together the disparate 
elements o f the preceding analysis.
c
VI
THE INCUMBENT OF THE ULTIMATE JUDICIAL OFFICE
V I.l Iudex  as Ideal Type
It will be recalled from  earlier discussion that one o f the consequences o f Weber’s
epistemological stance against the neo-K antians o f the so-called Baden or Southwest
G erm an School was his adoption of the view that social science, as a nomothetic, as
opposed to an idiographic, discipline, could validly evolve a methodology in which
abstraction and generalisation, and the form ation o f sociological concepts (in
particular, the ideal type), were a key to knowledge o f the world o f hum an actions
and behaviours. As Weber observes in Economy and Society:
"It has continually been assumed as obvious that the science o f sociology seeks to 
form ulate type concepts and generalized uniform ities o f em pirical process. This 
distinguishes it from  history, which is oriented to the causal analysis and 
explanation of individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural 
significance." 1
Critics of Weber have argued that his stance in relation to the neo-K antians (the 
’protagonists’ o f the School being Wilhelm W indelband, Heinrich R ickert and Emil 
Lask) was neither unproblem atic nor free o f contradiction. One com m entator has 
concluded that Weber failed to grasp some o f R ickert’s most im portant argum ents in 
Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsb ildung (The L im its o f  Concept 
Formation in Natural Science -  R ickert’s m ajor work). 2 It might therefore be thought, 
in the light o f the evident significance which Weber accorded to R ickert’s (among 
others’) work, that any valid accusation o f ’aberration’ on Weber’s part m ight in some 
sense underm ine the Weberian scholar’s confidence in Weber’s epistemological and 
methodological teachings. How seriously Weber’s teachings may be thought to be thus 
underm ined, of course, must depend on the weight to be accorded to criticisms
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directed against them , but it seems to remain perversely true that fo r as long as there 
is controversy and debate as to the import o f Weber’s writings, the m ore reassurance 
there is that those writings will achieve an authority  which surpasses even that which 
they presently enjoy.
Against this background, we should recognise that the b rie f account o f Weber’s 
methodological teachings given in chapter II serves only as an elem entary ’expository’ 
presentation o f the main features of Weberian sociology, but su ffic ien t nonetheless to 
enable Weber’s device o f the ideal type to be recognised as the culm ination o f various 
strands o f Weberian sociology. We should at the same time recognise in the ideal type 
o f the incum bent o f the ultimate judicial o ffice, Iudex , the culm ination o f various 
strands o f the preceding analysis.
Starting w ith the ideal type as heuristic device, we may recall tha t fo r Weber a 
scientific reproduction o f the reality o f the social world is a practical, i f  not a logical, 
impossibility. Hence the investigator necessarily utilises concepts w hich em brace only 
parts of the reality considered to be of significance. 3 We may fu rth e r recall that 
Weber’s doctrine o f value-relevance (or Wertbeziehung), which derived from  Rickert, 
entails that values which contain criteria o f significance serve the  investigator as a 
point o f reference fo r the selection of phenomena from  the inexhaustible plurality  of 
possible objects o f cognition.
Again, we may rem em ber that in Weber’s view the values which govern the choice of 
phenomena o f interest and guide the investigator in the form ulation o f generalising 
principles that apply to the subject m atter o f his investigation are those adopted by the 
investigator himself. According to this view, the investigator is in the best position to
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assess significance and importance, influenced as he is by the nature o f the problems 
under investigation, the nature o f the subject m atter, and the particular questions 
requiring solution.
The ideal type, then, as we may recall from  previous discussion, articulates sim ilarities 
found in numerous individual cases and subsumes these under the generalising terms 
o f the construct. As Weber rem arked, the ideal type is form ed by the synthesis o f a 
great many discrete concrete individual phenomena which are arranged according to 
"one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints" into a unified  analytical construct. 4
An ideal type may incorporate a theoretically conceived pure type o f subjective 
meaning, and one, moreover, which is attributable to an hypothetical actor in a given 
type o f action. 5 As we noted earlier, the actors are ’hypothetical’ because the 
theoretically conceived subjective meaning does not correspond to any specific actor 
bu t incorporates similarities found in a plurality o f typical cases. This is o f course the 
essence o f ideal-typification. To concentrate on the unique a ttributes o f a specific  
actor would clearly be a denial o f the rationale of type form ulation through 
generalisation and abstraction.
As we m ight expect, it is at the level o f subjective meaning that the ideal-type 
construct assumes particular significance. This is especially true o f the form ulation of 
a judicial ideal type. In the present context, the narrower function o f the type is as a 
vehicle through which to reach an understanding of the ideative device o f the ju ra l 
relation. Furtherm ore, the ideality o f the rational ideal type serves as a theoretical 
justification  for placing emphasis upon those elements of judicial social action which 
achieve ’self-realisation’. Such action is ’successful’ according to the criteria  o f
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’success’ which the actors themselves define fo r the action in question.
The notion o f subjective meaning and its relationship to the device o f the ju ra l 
relation was examined in detail earlier, firs t in term s o f a Parsonian chess game 
paradigm  and then in terms o f a rudim entary model o f judicial action, based on an 
analogy with the much sim plified situation o f an um pire. The sim plified model 
provided us with a fundam ental starting point fo r the incorporation o f ideal-typical 
subjective meaning into a type construct o f Iudex. Our first assumption is o f an 
hypothetical judge (treated as ’ego’) who orients his official action partly by reference 
to the evaluative meaning which he ascribes to perceived states o f ’fact’ that are 
capable o f attribution to others (treated as ’alter’). G enerally speaking the ’others* in 
question will normally be litigants. This ascribed meaning is the ’legal meaning* o f the 
states o f ’fact’ in question, that is, the meaning which such states o f ’fact’ bear by 
reference to legal norms.
One aspect o f this m eaning-ascribing process is the activity o f conceiving o f the 
norm ative position of litigants in relational terms. For present purposes we m ay 
fu rth e r assume that Iudex  conceives o f the relative position o f one litigant w ith respect 
to another in terms of the action which one litigant ought to have perform ed or ought 
now to perform  in relation to another litigant. Furtherm ore, these conceptual acts 
form  a basis for the meaningful orientation o f judicial action.
But the ideal-typical subjective meaning associated w ith judicial action involves more 
than conceiving of the legal position o f litigants or others in relational terms. This is 
only part o f the specialised activity known as adjudication. This activity involves 
m aking judgm ents about human action or events a ttribu ted  to hum an in tervention.
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Judges do not, though they often may, simply and m echanically declare that one 
litigant stands in a specified relationship with respect to another litigant. If  that were 
the case, there would presumably be no need for society to create legal institutions 
such as courts, tribunals, arbiters or umpires. It is because adjudication utilises an 
unique array  o f conceptual techniques that the act o f conceiving o f ju ra l relations 
between legal personae cannot be treated as simply a mechanical conceptual act.
The fact o f the m atter is that even in the case o f relatively straightforw ard legal 
disputes (so-called ’hard cases’ aside 6) the act of conceiving o f ju ra l relations as 
obtaining between legal personae is as much an act constitutive o f those relations as it 
is an act declaratory o f them. One reason fo r this is that by virtue o f adjective legal 
norms a litigant’s substantive claim against another litigant is ’transformed* into a 
claim against the court for a remedy which may involve perform ance o f a d ifferen t 
kind from  that prescribed by substantive norms. For example, an obligation ad factum  
praestandum  may be ’converted into* an obligation to pay damages. Furtherm ore, a 
court may validly and quite properly place a nuance o f meaning on substantive norms 
which litigants had not contemplated at any prior stage in the proceedings even though 
until this stage the litigants may have oriented their action by reference to these 
norms. The substantive claims of litigants (as they conceive them ) are seldom left 
’intact* following an adjudication because compromises must be m ade, interests must 
be weighed and balanced, and competing interpretations o f legal norm s and o f factual 
occurrences to which legal meaning is ascribed must be resolved in favour o f one or 
other party. M oreover, the court’s power to classify or re-classify  legally relevant 
’facts’ fo r legal purposes by reference to legal norms may also lead to the constitution 
anew of legal relationships between litigating parties.
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For these reasons an examination o f the process of adjudication is indispensable to the 
task of com prehending the jural relation. It seems necessary, then, on the assumption 
that adjudication is not by any means an arbitrary, nor even largely a discretionary, 
process to identify  at least some of the guiding principles which inform  this activity.
Fuller 7, M acCorm ick 8 and D w o rk in 9 have all stressed the im portance o f the 
adjudicatory process in hum an affairs. As Fuller says,
"It is custom ary to think o f adjudication as a means o f settling disputes or 
controversies. This is, o f course, its most obvious aspect. The norm al occasion 
for a resort to adjudication is when parties are at odds with one another, often 
to such a degree that a breach of social order is threatened.
More fundam entally, however, adjudication should be viewed as a form  o f social 
ordering, as a way in which the relations o f men to one another are governed 
and regulated." 10
Since the conceptual act o f perceiving o f jural relations between litigating parties is 
expressed in the process o f adjudication, this process is central to our form ulation of 
the ideal-type construct Iudex , and is dealt with later in this chapter.
A nother requirem ent for the construction o f an ideal type as Weber conceives it is the 
incorporation o f causal relationships within the type. It will doubtless be recalled that 
Weber posited a twofold requirem ent for an ’adequate’ interpretation or typ ification  of 
a given mode o f social action: causal adequacy and adequacy on the level of 
meaning. 11
These requirem ents must be presumed to apply in the form ulation o f an ideal-type 
construct o f any mode o f social action, including judicial action. As m entioned 
previously, in order to accord with a strict reading of Weber’s m ethodological position, 
it appears necessary for the investigator to draw upon data consisting o f ’concrete
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individual phenomena’ and to make generalisations from  these data for inclusion in the 
construct. Furtherm ore, Weber’s theoretical stance requires that typical sequences of 
causally linked ’events’, determ ined from  observation o f one ’event’, overt or 
subjective, being followed or accompanied by another ’event’, 12 should be cast in 
terms o f probability.
In form ulating an ideal-type construct o f the ultim ate judge, Iudex> in order to 
perceive the jural relation from  that perspective, the requirem ent o f causal adequacy is 
to an extent satisfied in terms o f the ’causal’ dimension o f Weber’s sociological 
definition o f legal right, according to which there exists a ’chance’ or ’probability’ that 
the aid o f a ’coercive apparatus’ may be invoked in support o f a righ t-ho lder’s ideal or 
m aterial interests. 13 This probability or chance resides in the fact that as part o f the 
so-called Weberian ’coercive apparatus’ o f the legal order, a judicial organ can 
normally be relied upon (in a causal sense) to respond to a valid request on the part o f 
the right-holder for intervention on his behalf. Following such a ’request’ the court 
can normally be expected (again in a causal sense) to in terpret legal norms and also 
legally relevant ’facts’ established in evidence, and to ’apply’ those norms to the ’facts’ 
so established. Following this, ’judgm ent’ is given accordingly. The Weberian causal 
’probability’ therefore refers to that of a legal order being mobilised to take action in 
the m anner described.
As we may recall, a Weberian ’probability’ also resides in the power elem ent o f the 
ju ral relation in terms of which, in a context o f ’dom ination’ or ’H errscha ft\ there 
exists a probability or chance that a command (e.g. of a court) w ith a given specific 
content will be obeyed by a given group of persons (e.g. litigants or enforcem ent 
personnel, or both). 14
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The reiterative remarks on the nature o f the Weberian ideal type in this chapter have 
presupposed the crucial element o f rationality. As we may recall, according to Weber, 
the ideal type attempts to hypothesise what course a given type of action would take i f  
it were strictly rational, unaffected by errors and emotional factors. 15 The rational 
elements o f the ideal type were discussed in chapter II but no attem pt was m ade to 
consider Weber’s application o f the notion o f rationality in the legal context. A nthony 
T. K ronm an’s remarks are useful here as he undertakes an exam ination o f W eber’s 
various applications o f the term  ’rationality’ in reference to characteristics o f law and 
legal thinking. 16
In K ronm an’s view, the term  may, depending on context, refer to any one o f several 
related characteristics o f law and legal thinking. These are briefly sum m arised below 
to assist us in identifying the criteria o f rationality that may inform  a rational jud icia l 
ideal-type construct. On this basis, Iudex  should be looked upon as functioning in a 
legal system to which the term  ’rational’ may be applied. We should be aw are, 
however, that these criteria may not necessarily be found to exist together in any 
specific legal system, although it is possible in theory that they might.
First, according to Kronm an, Weber uses the term  ’rational’ to denote the state o f 
being governed by rules or principles:
"For a legal order to be rational in this sense, it is only necessary that the rights 
and obligations of individuals be determ ined by principles having some degree 
o f generality and that the principles in question be identifiable." 17
In K ronm an’s view if  a legal order approxim ates to a "collection o f idiosyncratic 
judgm ents or decrees" incapable o f subsumption under one or more general rules, it is 
to that extent less ’rational’. The system’s predisposition towards the determ ination o f
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issues by reference to legal norms must entail that a judge occupying o ffice in a legal 
order which is ’rational’ in this sense would apply pre-existing laws or general 
principles in the disposition o f all or most o f the cases before him. This would 
presum ably distinguish such a ’system -rational’ judge from  one possessing 
discretionary powers to dispose o f cases according, perhaps to his own sense o f 
’propriety’.
According to K ronm an, Weber also uses the term  ’rational’ to designate the system atic 
quality o f a legal order. Kronm an calls this ’system -building’. A ccording to 
K ronm an’s reading o f Weber, this involves,
"...the construction o f a comprehensive, gapless and internally consistent body o f 
rules deliberately arranged so as to give every actual or conceivable event a 
determ inate legal meaning." 18
We have already seen that it was Weber’s belief that this type o f ’system atization’ o f 
the legal order found its highest expression in five postulates derived from  the 
Pandectists’ Civil Law. 19
The first o f these postulates, as we may recall, is that every concrete legal decision is 
an ’application’ o f an abstract legal proposition to a concrete ’fact situation’. 20 The 
fif th  postulate is that every social action o f hum an beings must always be visualised as 
either an ’application’ or ’execution’ o f legal propositions, or as an ’in fringem ent’ 
thereof. 21 Taking these two postulates together, we may conclude, as K ronm an does, 
that any human action or any event or state o f affairs, which is in some sense legally 
significant, should be distinguished from  one which lacks legal significance altogether. 
Those actions, events or states o f affairs which have legal significance should then be 
"assigned a specific juristic  meaning through the construction o f legal rules or
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propositions". 22
The conceptual act o f ascribing legal meaning to hum an actions, or to events or states 
o f affairs which may be attributable to human in tervention, is an inherently rational 
process according to this view and certainly justifies the incorporation o f the 
m eaning-ascribing function into a rational ideal type o f Iudex. We should note that 
Weber makes explicit reference to the process o f ascribing legal meaning to hum an 
action (or the ’institutionalisation* of ’facts’ in the sense o f the preceding analysis) in 
the context o f  his discussion o f rationality, and particularly , o f ’systematization*:
"The specifically m odern form  of system atization, which developed out o f 
Rom an law, has its point o f departure in the logical analysis o f the meaning o f 
the legal propositions as well as o f the social actions." 23
Presumably, in this context Weber does not refer to ’social actions’ in the lim iting 
sense o f ’social action* as defined in Part I o f Economy and Society  24 involving in 
some sense the meaningful orientation of action. We may recall that ’social action* so 
defined also involves the individual in taking ’account’ o f the ’behaviour o f others’. 
M uch hum an action may, o f course, be legally m eaningful while falling outside 
Weber’s defin ition  o f social action.
The th ird  and fourth  senses in which Weber uses the term  ’rational’ are briefly  dealt 
with by K ronm an. The third sense refers to the m ethod o f legal analysis based upon 
the ’abstract interpretation o f meaning*. 25 Now although Weber fails to elaborate upon 
this, it is probable that he is referring here to methods o f in terpretation  o f legal 
propositions or o f states o f ’fact’ which are independent o f the perceived factual 
content o f legally relevant issues presented to the court, bu t depend on attributions o f 
meaning through purely intellectual ratiocination, fo r example, deduction, induction,
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analogical reasoning, inference, and so on.
Weber’s fourth  sense of ’rationality’ presupposes a context o f prim itive legal 
institutions. Here ’rationality’ refers to techniques o f dispute resolution which are 
subject to ’control by the intellect’ in contrast to those which merely employ ’magical 
means’. 26 For Weber the use o f magic is an abnegation o f earthly control to a 
supernatural agency and is thus a denial o f the ’rational’ as he conceives it.
Weber’s various usages of the term  ’rational’ in reference to legal phenomena provide 
some guidance for the selection o f criteria  o f rationality fo r inclusion in a judicial 
ideal type. But rationality is a ’relative’ concept. If, as Harold Fallding argues, 
rationality is one of the conditions o f ’successful’ social action in a context o f action 
that is capable o f achieving ’self-realisation’, 27 then the criteria  o f rationality to 
which an investigator might look fo r guidance are those set by the actors themselves. 
The measuring rod o f what the actor regards as ’successful’ or ’unsuccessful* may be 
identified then articulated by the investigator. If  rationality is relative to the action 
under investigation, it would be pointless for the investigator to postulate criteria  o f 
rationality which are inappropriate to the legal order under investigation. Thus it 
would be meaningless to advance a model o f a developed western legal order as an 
ideal-typical standard o f m easurem ent o f legal procedures operative in a system of 
tribal law. In the present context, we should assume that Iudex  as a ju risprudential 
model is more closely associated w ith Anglo-Am erican jurisprudence and legal thought 
than any other system of jurisprudential thought.
In the rem ainder of this chapter, we will attem pt to outline what are considered to be 
the ’ideal-typical* components o f the social action associated with the jud icial office
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by ascribing such action to a fictive ’ultim ate’ judge. This will be the beginnings o f 
the ideal type Iudex.
We will deal firstly with the sociological concept of the ’office’ and then give 
consideration to the activity o f adjudication. Thereafter we will consider the notion o f 
’ultimacy* in relation to the judicial office, and finally we will attem pt to draw  
conclusions from the ideal type Iudex  as characterised in this chapter so fa r  as 
throwing light on the concept o f the ju ra l relation.
VI.2 The Concent of the  ’Office*
The ’typical’ judicial ’functionary’ o f a western legal system, fo r exam ple, a legal 
system in the Anglo-Am erican m ould, occupies a position to which there are attached 
obligations, more commonly referred  to as ’duties*. These determ ine the tasks, actions 
and behaviours associated with the position which the occupant o f the position is 
expected (by others) to perform  and which he to a greater or lesser extent m ay him self 
feel bound to perform . This position is more usually called an ’office*, and this is 
reflected in the chosen designation o f the hypothetical heuristic construct Iudex  as the 
incum bent o f the ultimate judicial o ffice . As mentioned earlier, ad judication  and 
ultimacy will be discussed later in this chapter, but for the moment it is the concept o f 
the ’office’ that concerns us.
Weber does not actually define  the concept o f ’office*, but he gives w hat has come to 
be accepted as a classical account o f its main features in the context o f his ideal 
typification o f bureaucracy: more specifically in his ideal type o f legal au thority  
employing a bureaucratic adm inistrative staff. 28
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It is clear from  Weber’s analysis that ’office’ (as indicated in our in troductory  rem arks) 
involves a position, status or institutionalised role, 29 to which expected perform ances 
or functions attach which are in some sense separate or detached from  the person o f 
the incum bent o f the office. These perform ances or functions are generally considered 
to subsist notwithstanding any change o f incum bent, and the ’identity’ w hich attaches 
to the office as such (e.g. the office o f President) is considered to be conceptually 
independent o f the identity as such o f the incum bent for the tim e being. The 
Am erican sociologist Robert M erton rem arks illuminatingly on the nature o f the 
form al organization and the place of the office as a component of the organization:
"A form al, rationally organized social structure involves clearly defined  patterns 
o f activity in which, ideally, every series o f actions is functionally related to the 
purposes o f the organization. In such an organization there is integrated a series 
o f offices, o f hierarchized statuses, in which inhere a num ber o f obligations and 
privileges closely defined by lim ited and specific rules. Each o f these offices 
contains an area o f im puted competence and responsibility. A uthority , the 
power of control which derives from  an acknowledged status, inheres in the 
office and not in the particular person who perform s the official role. O fficial 
action ordinarily occurs within the fram ew ork o f preexisting rules o f  the 
organization." 30
Weber recognises the clear division between the ’functionary’ (or ’o ffic ia l’) in his 
official capacity and in his individual capacity. For Weber, the typical person in 
authority  occupying an office is subject to an impersonal order towards w hich his 
actions are oriented. This is true, according to Weber, not only for persons exercising 
legal authority but "for the elected president o f a state". 31 A ccording to W eber, 
anyone who obeys such a person in authority  does not owe obedience to him  as an 
individual, but rather, owes obedience to the impersonal order. 32 The separation o f 
the official’s individual and official capacities is also manifested (in term s o f W eber’s 
pure type) in the complete separation o f the property belonging to the organization, 
which is controlled within the sphere o f office, and the personal p roperty  o f  the
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official. 33
Furtherm ore, the incum bent of an office cannot ’appropriate* his official position, that 
is, it does not ’vest* in him personally and is not transferable by him  to whomever he 
should designate, although an official may often delegate authority . Thus, as Weber 
says,
"In the rational type case, there is also a com plete absence o f appropriation of 
his official position by the incumbent. Where ’rights* to an office exist, as in 
the case o f judges, and recently o f an increasing proportion o f officials and 
even o f workers, they do not normally serve the purpose o f appropriation by the 
official, but o f securing the purely objective and independent character o f the 
conduct o f the office so that it is oriented only to the relevant norms." 34
Because specialised training is usually necessary to qualify  an individual for occupancy 
o f an official position, 85 this must restrict the candidature fo r a position to a circle of 
persons who hold the necessary qualifications. But within  this circle, a principle of 
perpetual replaceability may apply such that one position-occupant can always be 
replaced by another holding similar qualifications. This means that although the 
possession by a candidate of unique attributes may often  be desirable, it may not be a 
prerequisite o f official tenure.
A fu rther characteristic of rational legal authority  is the  conferm ent on officials of 
w hat Weber calls a "specified sphere o f competence". According to Weber, the 
obligation to obey an official applies only within the sphere o f the rationally delimited 
authority  which has been conferred upon the official. 36 This sphere o f competence 
involves:
"...(a) a sphere of obligations to perform  functions which has been m arked o ff as 
part o f a systematic division of labour, (b) The provision o f the incum bent with 
the necessary authority to carry out these functions, (c) That the necessary
105
means o f compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to definite 
conditions". 37
The three characteristics o f the office discussed above, i.e. separation o f official from 
individual identity, ’perpetual replaceability’, and conferm ent o f a specified sphere of 
competence, as we m ight expect, have implications in the judicial context for the 
concept of the jural relation. The remarks to follow should be considered in the light 
o f our previous claim that the ju ra l relation obtaining betw een litigants may be 
perceived as a partial determ inant o f the relationship obtaining betw een a judge {qua 
official) and litigants, in terms of establishing to a greater or lesser extent the content 
o f any judgm ent which the judge may render in a question w ith a given litigant.
Since the office establishes the action entailed in the execution o f the office and 
sharply differentiates between the official in his individual and official capacities, the 
judge as ’judicial functionary’ must be looked upon in the ideal case as one whose 
conception o f the ju ra l relation obtaining in a given instance is m oulded and shaped 
by requirem ents imposed by the judicial office, and not by considerations personal to 
the judge as an individual. In the ideal case, then, the judge adopts the ’official line’ 
and does not engage in unbridled creativity. This is not, o f course, to deny the 
elem ent of judicial discretion which is not necessarily inconsistent w ith the adoption 
by a judge o f an ’official line’.
The principles of identity  separation and ’perpetual replaceability* add w eight to the 
view that the ideal holder of judicial office by, in a sense, transcending the uniqueness 
of his own individuality, establishes a pattern o f judicial activity which is stable and 
not given to arbitrariness or caprice. What this means is that unless an exercise o f 
judicial discretion is called for in a given case, the personal identity  o f the judge who 
decides the case will make little practical d ifference to the outcome. Furtherm ore, the 
criteria  for selection o f candidates for judicial office must ensure uniform ity  among
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those holding judicial office by elim inating those who would be unlikely to discharge 
the duties o f the office in accordance with the objective or in ter-sub jec tive ly  
acknowledged requirements o f the office.
The fu rther requirem ent that m atters w ithin the scope o f the official function  be 
reduced to writing, as Weber points out, 38 would result in greater stability  o f official 
action within the judicial office. Com m itm ent o f official acts to w riting w ould also 
increase awareness o f the need to achieve consistency in judicial acts and to m inim ise 
contradictory decision-m aking.
The ju ral relation is thus in m any ways not an ideative device that ’emanates* from  an 
individual in the accepted sense. It is, rather, an ’emanation* from , or the product of, 
an essentially synthetic persona: the holder o f judicial ’office*. This persona conceives 
the ju ral relation in terms o f officially  posited criteria and filters out extrinsic criteria . 
Thus, ’idiosyncrasies* of the judge as an individual may well be kept in check.
Furtherm ore, the fact that the judge m ust act w ithin a ’sphere o f competence* means 
that many of his official acts will be ’du ty-acts’ in the sense of acts com plying w ith 
norms determ ining what he may or may not do.
The conclusion to be drawn from  this b rief discussion is that the typical judge 
occupying an office is largely an instrum ent o f the impersonal order o f w hich he is 
part. Within this order, each m em ber exerts a constraining influence upon every  other 
member. Furtherm ore, as it happens, the judicial office is a public office. H ence the 
typical holder of judicial office is to a greater or lesser extent sub ject to political 
constraints and to the vagaries o f public opinion.
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VI.3 A djudication
As a species o f social action, the activity o f ’judging’ hum an behaviour, that of 
’adjudication’, involves, in Weberian terms, ’taking account o r  the behaviour o f others 
in a quite unique way. The normal context in which recourse to the process o f 
adjudication may be appropriate is, as Fuller implies, 39 a factual situation in which at 
least two parties are in dispute relative to a particular issue and at least one o f the 
parties wishes the dispute to be resolved by means o f the rendering by a designated 
person e.g. a judge or arbiter, or body of persons, o f a ’decision’ or ’judgment* which 
disposes, or purports to dispose, o f the dispute, hopefully to the satisfaction o f the 
disputants. In this context, ’dispute’ may also denote a situation in which the exaction 
o f a crim inal penalty may be appropriate. In that case, the ’disputants’ are, on the one 
hand, a crim inal suspect, and on the other hand, a private or public prosecutor.
We may recall, however, that Fuller believes that the adjudicatory function involves, at 
a more fundam ental level, the ordering and governance o f "the relations, o f m en to one 
another". 40 Now it might be objected that hum an social relations may be governed 
and regulated w ithout the necessary intervention o f an adjudicatory  mechanism . But 
this is not Fuller’s point. What he appears to be saying is that in so fa r  as 
adjudication is employed in human society as a means o f settling disputes, it fulfils 
this function by making use o f a technique in which hum an relationships are 
conceived in a certain way. That is, they are conceived as ju ra l relations: social 
relationships whose content is defined by reference to legal norms or to norms which 
possess ’validity’ 41 for purposes o f a given judicial decision, and in term s o f which
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one litigant or other legal persona had, now has, or will have a duty  to act in a certain 
m anner in a question with another litigant or other legal persona. This simplifying 
account o f adjudication is perhaps the essence o f what is fo r present purposes the 
central feature  o f adjudication, that is, the technique, which is by no means exclusive 
to adjudication, o f conceiving of ju ral relations as obtaining between parties to a 
dispute. I f  ju ra l relations are an indispensable com ponent o f  the activity  o f ’judging* 
hum an behaviour, or ’institutional facts’, i.e. ’facts’ attribu tab le to hum an behaviour, 
it follows that by understanding the ways in which the ad judicatory  process both 
incorporates and creates jural relations, we may discover how this process therefore 
also fashions and moulds the jural relation.
In this chapter we can attempt only the briefest possible consideration o f the 
adjudicatory process, consistent only with our aim to understand that process so far as 
shedding light upon the ideative device of the ju ra l relation. To that end, the 
adjudicatory  process, according to the most fundam ental analysis, will be treated as 
involving three related processes:
1. the ascertainm ent of ’fa c ts’ considered relevant in the context o f the
adjudication;
2. the ascertainm ent by processes of law -finding or law -creation  o f legal norms
considered relevant in the context o f the adjudication;
3. the *application’ o f the legal norms so ascertained to the ’facts’ so ascertained.
The firs t two activities, ascertainment of ’facts’ and o f legal norm s, are essential
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prelim inaries to the third activity: the ’application’ of legal norms to ’facts’. We 
considered aspects of this third activity earlier in the context o f our discussion o f legal 
meaning. We may recall that the legal meaning o f a human act or an event or ’fact* is 
the meaning which it bears by reference to legal norms specifically applied towards its 
interpretation. Recalling our discussion o f Kelsen, 42 the legal norm  functions as a 
’scheme o f interpretation* of acts, events or ’facts*. This meaning, as we considered 
earlier, may form part of the subjective meaning o f judicial action. M ore specifically, 
in the present context, legal meaning may form  part of the subjective m eaning o f the 
action o f Iudex , in terms of which Iudex  orients his judicial action to the effect o f 
granting or issuing a judgm ent, decree, sentence or other court order.
Hence, the third activity mentioned above is, in a sense, the ’end’ o f adjudication. 
This activity involves the determ ination o f the content o f ju ral relations obtaining 
between litigants and any other interested parties. A djudication is thus concerned 
with the ascertainment for legal purposes o f the content o f any rights, duties, powers, 
liabilities or other ju ral relations conceived, in the present analysis by Iu d ex , between 
litigants and other interested parties. On being so conceived, such ju ra l relations 
determ ine for Iudex  an appropriate course o f action to take in the discharge o f his 
official functions.
We will now consider in turn each o f the three activities associated w ith the 
adjudicatory process outlined above.
A djudication, then, is firstly a process concerned with the ascertainm ent or ’finding*, 
and the interpretation, of ’facts’ considered relevant to the subject m atter o f the 
adjudication. According to Paton’s A Textbook o f  Jurisprudence, 43
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"The task of the court in almost all actual litigation is to ascertain the issues in 
dispute between the parties and to determine those issues usually in favour o f 
one or more o f the parties to them and against the others." 44
The determ ination o f ’facts’ (in the legal sense) is an integral part o f this activity:
"In the course o f ascertaining and determ ining those issues the court must make 
such findings as to m atters o f fact as are relevant to the issues and as are 
perm itted by the evidence adduced by the parties ..." 45
Hohfeld categorises facts as either ’operative’ or ’evidential’. 46 We considered 
’operative facts’ in chapter IV, 47 and should perhaps state here that for present 
purposes ’operative facts’ are considered to be legally relevant ’facts’ whose occurrence 
’triggers’ the operation o f a legal norm in the sense that there exist grounds fo r the 
ascription by Iudex  of a ju ral relation to appropriate legal personae. 48
On the other hand ’evidential facts’ are defined by Hohfeld as facts w hich, on being 
ascertained, afford some logical basis for inferring some other fact (e.g. an ’operative 
fact’). 49 More concretely it is probably safe to say that ’evidential facts’ are legally 
relevant ’facts’ other than ’operative facts’, which must be proved or ascertained in 
order to satisfy legal requirem ents. For example let us assume a legal norm  o f the 
form: U nder circumstances n, persons categorised as X shall have a right... . H ere, 
the ’operative facts’ which must be established in order to substantiate the righ t are 
circumstances n, while the ’evidential facts’ which must be established are 
categorisation conditions X.
Interestingly, in a footnote H ohfeld lists four possible modes of ascertainment o f  facts, 
both ’operative’ and ’evidential’:
"1. By judicial admissions (what is not disputed); 2. By jud ic ia l notice, or 
knowledge (what is known or easily knowable); 3. By judicial perception (w hat 
is ascertained directly through the senses; cf. ’real evidence*); 4. By judicia l 
inference (what is ascertained by reasoning from  facts already ascertained by
I l l
one or more o f the four methods here outlined)." 50
The problem of selection or choice o f ’facts’ out o f the limitless flux o f everyday life 
is, from  a practical point of view, at least partly solved by a test o f relevancy o f  legal 
norms considered to have a bearing upon the issues before the court, and by a test of 
relevancy and materiality  o f facts. The latter test involves the rational evaluation of 
facts by reference to any value criteria considered reasonable or appropriate  in the 
circumstances. This process is designed to filter out those facts considered relatively 
unim portant or trivial and to give precedence to those facts considered weighty or 
material. This point is expressed thus in Paton’s Textbook'.
"Just as the relevancy o f a particular fact is determ ined by the hypothesis which 
the scientist is investigating, so out o f the tangled web o f hum an affa irs the law 
m ust decide what facts are material to the issue. ...In one sense we do not know 
what principles of law are applicable until we know the m aterial facts, bu t what 
facts are material in a given claim is determ ined by the fram ew ork o f principles 
we call the law. To prove every fact would be futile, and the lawyer is guided 
in his proof by the particular rules that he thinks are applicable." 51
Kelsen draws our attention to a fu rther peculiarity o f ’facts* in the context o f 
adjudication. For according to Kelsen there is no ’fact in itselF in the w orld o f  law. 
’Facts* are not ’absolute’ in adjudication. In Kelsen’s view, "...there are only facts 
ascertained by a competent organ in a procedure prescribed by law". 52 K elsen does 
not, o f course, deny that legal procedures may attem pt so far as possible to apprehend 
the ’real facts’ which confront a court in a given case. The point Kelsen is m aking is, 
rather, that generally speaking the ’facts’ ascertained by a court in accordance with 
evidence-adducing legal procedures are treated as conclusive fo r all legal purposes. 
Indeed this would still be so if  there were no (or only partial) correspondence betw een 
the ’facts’ so adduced and ’actuality*. Futherm ore, this would hold in cases w here the 
judge is procedurally excluded from  the process o f determ ining the tru th  or falsity  of 
’facts* established in evidence, as in the case o f ju ry  trials or where questions are 
subm itted for determ ination by a court o f appeal.
v.
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Where a ’division of labour’ such as this does exist w ithin the legal system , the 
judgm ent o f an hypothetical Iudex  (which is presumed to be the ’u ltim ate’ judgm ent 
o f the system) is no less his judgm ent because others at a lower level in the hierarchy 
have made decisions (e.g. as to tru th  o f ’facts’) which may be treated  fo r legal 
purposes as conclusive both for that and for superior levels in the h ierarchy.
Thus, recognition must be given in hypothesising the judgm ent o f a theoretically 
conceived ideal-type construct Iudex  to the procedural reality of a legal h ierarchy  in 
which ’ultim ate’ judgm ents may themselves be composites or syntheses o f m any  
decisions, or ’holdings* of law or ’fact’, taken at d ifferen t levels in the adjudication 
process. This procedural reality necessarily calls for special legal rules. As A.M . 
Honore says:
"The notions o f a decision and a reason fo r  a decision apply prim arily  to 
individuals. When they are applied to a group, such as a court consisting o f 
several judges, artificial rules are needed to determ ine what shall count as a 
decision or reason of the group." 58
Thus, on the one hand the epistemological assumptions o f ideal type construction in  a 
Weberian version o f social science incline towards conceiving theoretical constructs 
(individuals or modes of behaviour) which need not correspond to the actuality  o f a 
particular individual or of his behaviour in a given case. These constructs, as W eber 
claims, consist o f a synthesis o f a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena. 54 But, on the o ther hand, 
having recognised the degree of abstraction demanded by the Weberian ideal type, we 
should also recognise that judges themselves may ’act’ in a m anner which according to 
the legal system 's own artificial rules is i tse lf  a synthesis of the ’action* (decisions, 
judgm ents, ’holdings* and so on) o f numerous actors within the ad judicatory  process.
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This must be reflected in the theoretical entity Iudex.
We may therefore conclude that for purposes o f theory ’facts’ in the legal sense as 
conceived by Iudex  (or theoretically ascribed to Iudex)  are ’facts’ as determ ined in 
accordance w ith legal procedures which prescribe methods fo r the selection and 
’filtration’, and interpretation or reinterpretation o f ’actual facts’, whatever they may 
be. As the Am erican Legal Realist Jerom e F rank , advocating a doctrine o f 
’fact-skepticism ’, has observed, evidence adduced by a court may be oral and 
conflicting, witnesses are humanly fallible and m ay make mistakes in the observation 
o f what they saw and heard. Indeed, trial judges and jurors may have prejudices, 
both conscious and unconscious, for or against witnesses or parties to the adjudication. 
These factors may well colour the court’s perception o f the ’actual facts’. 55
Turning now to consider the second activity associated w ith adjudication, we find that 
the task o f ascertaining legal norms considered relevant to an adjudication is no less 
im portant than that o f ascertaining ’facts’ considered relevant in that context. Indeed, 
in a given case involving the ’application’ o f legal norms to ’facts’ it is not at all clear 
w hether the process o f ascertaining relevant ’facts’ logically precedes the process o f 
ascertaining relevant legal norms, or vice versa, since both processes are often  
inextricable.
This point has already been drawn to our attention in a passage quoted from  Paton’s 
Textbook. As Paton says,”...we do not know w hat principles o f law are applicable until 
we know the m aterial facts, but what facts are m aterial in a given claim is determ ined 
by the fram ew ork o f principles we call the law.” 56
Although the applicability o f appropriate legal norms is in some sense guided by the
114
perceived occurrence and ’materiality* o f ’facts’, generally speaking analytical 
jurisprudence has tended to treat the notion o f legal validity  as having a significant 
bearing upon the process o f ascertaining legal norms considered relevant to an 
adjudication in a given case. For present purposes, legal validity may be taken to 
refer to that ’quality* (e.g. ’origin*) which attaches, or is ascribed, to an individual 
legal norm and which determines more or less conclusively w hether that norm  is to be 
treated as one by reference to which the legal personnel (including Iudex) o f a given 
legal system may orient and evaluate their official action and evaluate the behaviour of 
’others’ such as litigants with a view to the orientation o f their official action.
H.L.A. H art’s notion o f the rule o f  recognition, postulated in The Concept o f  Law , is a 
criterion o f legal validity in the sense o f the present discussion. However, H art does 
not attem pt an elaborate delim itation o f the rule o f recognition and indeed it could be 
said that H art rather under-analyses this notion in The Concept o f  Law . In the context 
o f a discussion o f ’validity’ and ’existence* o f legal rules, H art makes the following 
observation which sheds some light on the notion o f the rule o f recognition.
"Where, on the other hand, as in a m ature legal system, we have a system of 
rules which includes a rule o f recognition so that the status o f a rule as a 
member of the system now depends on w hether it satisfies certain  criteria 
provided by the rule o f recognition, this brings with it a new application o f the 
word ’exist’". 57
H art furtherm ore asserts that the rule o f recognition exists "as a complex, but normally 
concordant, practice o f the courts, officials, and private persons in identify ing the law 
by reference to certain criteria". 58 Now H art’s com m entators have persuasively 
dem onstrated that the concept o f the rule o f recognition is by no means unproblem atic 
on the level o f analysis. Marcus Singer in particular has found considerable d ifficu lty  
in accepting the notion that the rule o f recognition can ’be’ a practice.
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"How can a rule be a practice? I should have thought that a practice would be
defined by rules, and find it odd that a rule should be iden tified  w ith a practice.
For this seems to me to im ply that it is not a rule at all, in anv accepted sense.
Can such a ’rule* (practice) be broken? violated? formulated?"
If  there is indeed a judicial practice in which recognition criteria are custom arily or 
constitutionally invoked, it must surely follow that norms of some kind o r another 
govern this practice rather than actually constitute the practice. A fte r all, is not a 
practice, at least in one sense, a course o f action followed or adhered to by v irtue o f 
norms of usage or custom? By this account, a practice would have to be treated  as 
being governed by norms and could not, w ithout considerable conceptual d istortion , be 
equated with those norms. On the other hand, it is often d ifficu lt to separate the de 
facto  component o f a practice from  the de ju re  component, and in  conceptual term s 
’practice* may well comprehend the norms which govern the de fac to  com ponent and 
which are quite simply inextricably enmeshed w ith that component.
But even if  the rule o f recognition is expressed in or governs the jud ic ia l practice to 
w hich H art refers there is still an even more intractable problem  fo r H art’s wider 
analytical stance. For according to H art a legal system also contains a rule o f 
adjudication which authorises or regulates all official judicial action. How w ould the 
rule o f adjudication be distinguished from  the rule of recognition if  each ru le in some 
way defines judicial practices or activities? If  judges are duty -bound  to apply ’valid 
law’ by virtue o f a rule o f adjudication, does this not suggest that the  rule o f 
adjudication itself contains recognition or identification criteria? I f  so, w ould it not 
then follow that a rule o f adjudication must in some respect subsum e a rule o f 
recognition? If  that in tu rn  is correct, could it not be convincingly m aintained tha t the 
rule o f recognition is redundant in H art’s scheme, and that if  criteria  o f  valid ity  exist 
at all (which is not disputed) they reside w ithin a rule of adjudication?
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Quite apart from  these difficulties, the norm ativity o f the rule of recognition seems to 
be questionable and indeed this is arguably borne out by Hart’s own analysis. For 
H art gives as an example o f an elem entary rule o f recognition the following 
proposition: "What the Queen in Parliam ent enacts is law". 60 Now this proposition is 
strikingly non-deontic and certainly possesses all the hallmarks o f a proposition o f 
fa c t , albeit one o f ’institutional fact’. It is quite simply a mystery that recognition 
criteria  o f the type advocated by H art should be thought to assume the fo rm  o f  a rule 
at all. A criterion o f what is a valid law does not seem to f it at all com fortably w ithin 
the notion o f a norm (or for that m atter a ’rule* in the Hartian sense).
Adm ittedly we cannot doubt the need to accept that recognition criteria o f some  sort 
have a place in legal thinking in general and jud icia l thinking in particular. There 
must be some means whereby legal personnel and others may conclusively iden tify  
w hat is to count as a valid norm of a given legal system for purposes o f m obilisation 
o f the coercive apparatuses o f that system. But whatever form the criterion  o f 
recognition may take, it necessarily specifies factual identificatory criteria even i f  the 
criteria  in question are nevertheless incorporated w ithin a legal norm such as, fo r 
example, H art’s rule of adjudication. Such a criterion  may thus take any o f a num ber 
o f forms. For example, a document o f description X  is a statute, or a  judgm ent o f 
the court o f appeal, or a bye-law , and so on. The criterion o f recognition m ay 
furtherm ore require that certain procedural form alities have been satisfied such as, fo r  
example, that a particular ’institutional fact* obtains (or has obtained) w hereby a 
statute is conclusively recognised as having been duly ’passed’ or o therw ise 
prom ulgated in accordance with a specified procedure.
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Then as we move deeper into the realm of adjudication and discover that there is 
more to judicial decision-m aking than ’finding’ applicable legal norms which are 
tailor-m ade fo r ’application* in a given case, the problem s that confront us are o f a 
thornier nature. Thus, the typical judge may be called upon to identify  the ratio 
decidendi o f  a previously decided ’case*. 61 The judge m ay also have to decide whether 
a general principle overrides a specific rule in a given instance or he may have to 
weigh up the m erits o f competing legal arguments, all o f  w hich are equally plausible 
(or implausible). M oreover, as Joseph Raz has shown, laws are usually systematically 
ordered and are thus so inter-related that special in terpretive techniques must be 
applied to attain  an understanding o f their meaning. 62 L aw -creation  is also part o f the 
judicial function, so it can come as no surprise that the ascertainm ent o f legal norms 
considered relevant to an adjudication is a task o f considerable complexity. For this 
reason it seems safer to assume that criteria o f recognition do not reside in a 
conceptually neat rule o f recognition as Hart suggests.
Indeed Neil M acCorm ick suggests that ’criteria o f recognition’, however defined, in 
fact establish what may be invoked by a judge (which may presum ably include Iudex) 
as a valid ground fo r his official judgment:
"It cannot then be said that the validity o f rules or o ther standards as such is 
determ ined by the rule o f recognition or that the rule o f recognition is the 
ground of validity of, or determines the existence o f, the rules or other 
standards to which it refers. ’Criteria o f recognition* determ ine what are valid 
as grounds fo r  jud ic ia l decisions". 63
The th ird  m ajor activ ity  involved in adjudication, that o f ’applying* legal norms to 
’facts’, as we have previously observed, is quite fundam ental to the conceptual 
technique o f ascribing ju ra l relations. For it is at the level o f jud icial law -application 
that the rights and duties o f litigants are authoritatively stated. But a concom itant o f
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the authoritative statement o f rights and duties is the form ulation by the court {Iudex) 
o f a judgm ent. An essential feature o f the judicial decision-m aking process, as Kelsen 
points out, is that factual conditions conceived in abstracto under the generalising
terms o f a legal norm must be found to be present in concreto in the ’actuality* of the
case presented to the court. 64
Kelsen argues that this in tu rn  involves the creation o f an individual norm which
addresses the specific facts o f the individual case. As Kelsen says,
"When settling a dispute between two parties or w hen sentencing an accused 
person to a punishm ent a court applies, it is true, a general norm  o f statutory or 
customary law. But simultaneously the court creates an individual norm 
providing that a definite sanction shall be executed against a definite 
individual". 65
This process, as Kelsen observes, involves the concretisation o f the general norm in its 
’application* to ’reality’:
"The general norm which, to certain abstractly determ ined conditions, attaches 
certain abstractly determ ined consequences, has to be individualized and 
concretized in order to come in contact with social life, to be applied to 
reality". 66
Law -application, however, is also causally significant in that the coercive apparatuses 
o f the legal order are set in motion conditionally upon the ’find ing’ and articulation by 
the court {Iudex) o f rights and duties (and other relationships) considered to obtain 
between a given legal persona A and legal persona B.
Iudex  occupies an unique position on the causal and tem poral continuum  that has its 
origins in the perceived occurrence of ’operative facts* and its resolution in the 
enforcem ent action that follows upon the judgm ent o f an {ex hypothesi) ultim ate court. 
In a sense, Iudex  is involved (though not necessarily actively) at a ll  points on this
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continuum .
First, evidence tending to establish the p rio r occurrence o f ’operative facts* and 
relevant ’evidential facts’, to use H ohfeld’s term , is presented to the court. Second, the 
court is involved in assessing the procedural validity of ’lawsuit-instituting* ’events’ 
and other procedural steps attending the conduct o f the case. T hird , the court itself 
(ultim ately, Iudex) grants a ’judgm ent’, and fourth , this ’judgment* under certain 
conditions constitutes a basis for the orientation o f the official action o f ’coercive 
agencies’, for example, a police force, prison or probation officers and so on. To the 
extent, if  at all, that each ’event* on this causal continuum  is capable o f individuation, 
we can imagine a sequential progression in which one ’event’ is seen to lead inevitably 
to another (later) ’event*.
We may recall that such a progression is at least envisaged by Weber’s causal rendition 
o f the legal right in which there exists a probability  that an individual (a natural or 
jurid ical person) may invoke the aid o f a ’coercive apparatus’ for the enforcem ent of 
his (or its) legal right.
Furtherm ore, each plausibly individuated ’event* on the causal continuum  culm inating 
in the enforcem ent of a legal right is also an ’institutional fact* in the sense discussed 
earlier. Iudex  ascribes legal meaning to each com ponent ’event*. The investigator, fo r 
his part, m ust attain an understanding o f the legal meaning which form s part o f  the 
subjective meaning o f the judicial social action o f Iudex.
As causal explanation and the ascription o f subjective meaning are m utually verifying 
processes, 67 the investigator must examine w hether his ascription o f m eaning is
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substantiated by the causal regularities which he observes, and correspondingly 
whether these ’external facts’ are borne out by his interpretive hypotheses.
The interpretive and causal explanations o f judicial social action thus find  their 
expression in the ideal-type construct Iudex  in terms that the judgm ent o f a court o f 
law is to be seen not merely as something m eaningful in its own righ t and a  product 
o f ’events’ (e.g. ’operative facts’) to which meaning has been ascribed. The gran t o f a 
judgm ent must also be conceived as at least a likely  outcome of certain  conditioning 
’events’ (such as ’operative facts’) and therefore as an ’event’ itself which is capable, to 
a greater or lesser extent, o f probabilistic determ ination.
As we have suggested earlier, the judgm ent of a court may be causally and 
interpretively significant beyond the immediate range o f parties directly affected  by it,
i.e. beyond litigants and officials concerned with enforcement. The decision, or more 
accurately, the ratio decidendi of the case may constitute a basis fo r the orien tation  o f 
action subsequent to the decision. Strictly speaking, though, these causal regularities, 
which are also m eaningful actions, lie beyond the scope o f an ideal-type construct 
concerned more narrowly with the explanation of judicia l action. But their causal and 
interpretive significance should be recognised.
These b rie f rem arks conclude the present discussion o f law -application and, more 
generally, o f adjudication. It remains now only to consider the sense in  w hich the 
ultim ate judicial office is ’ultimate’. This will complete our model o f the ideal type 
Iudex  form ulated in this chapter.
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VI.4 Ultim acy
It is as m uch a practical as a rational requirem ent that a system o f adjudication, 
however rudim entary, should be so organised that at one or more stages in the 
litigation process it is capable o f yielding a determ ination which, fo r purposes o f the 
system, conclusively establishes or disposes o f an issue o f law or ’fac t’ (or one 
combining law and ’fact’) which has been the subject o f litigation betw een the 
disputants.
From  the point o f view o f practicality, the system would undoubtedly break down if  
every ’finding’ o f ’fact’, interpretation of law and ’application’ o f law to ’fact’ were 
perpetually open to reconsideration. If  such a system existed, there could be no faith  
in the certainty o f the decision-m aking process. Furtherm ore, litigants would be 
unable to act in reliance upon judgm ents made by a court at any given time.
From  the point o f view o f rationality, a precedent-based system o f adjudication that 
perm itted the perpetual reopening o f cases for reconsideration would surely generate a 
meaningless collection o f inconsistent and contradictory decisions which could not 
possibly constitute a secure basis for the orientation o f social action.
A n hierarchical structure o f adjudication normally makes provision fo r certain 
elements o f an issue in dispute (usually ’findings’ o f ’fact’) to be disposed o f at a 
designated level o f the hierarchy (which is generally non-ultim ate). O ther elem ents 
(usually determ inations o f law or ’applications’ o f law to ’fact*) may in  general be 
conclusively disposed o f only a t the highest or ultim ate hierarchical level. The 
system’s final and authoritative declaration o f the legal rights and duties obtaining
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between litigants is treated for all purposes as being incapable o f appeal to a superior 
level o f the hierarchy, and it is, in a sense, the existence o f this Hohfeldian 
’disability’ or ’no-pow er’ (to pursue the issue fu rther) w hich actually establishes the 
finality  o f the system’s determination.
In some systems o f adjudication a principle o f finality  is enshrined in the doctrine of 
res judicata  in terms o f which a judgm ent that has been appealed to an ultimate 
hierarchical level exhausts the merits o f the issue in dispute. Such a judgm ent may 
not normally be subject to further review. As K arl O livecrona puts it,
"When a claim is definitely rejected by the court, the m atter comes to an end. 
The judgm ent debars the p lain tiff for all time from  getting his claim accepted 
by any court. According to the law of procedure the judgm ent will always be a 
cause fo r rejecting a new petition based on the same ground (the principle o f res 
judicata).* 6g
The position o f Iudex  as the occupant o f the judicial office at the ultim ate level o f the 
adjudicatory hierarchy in a sense guarantees the finality  o f any judgm ent granted by 
Iudex. What this means is that adjudicatory ultim acy is actually a concomitant of 
hierarchical ultimacy. The qualities o f authoritativeness and finality  are thus attached 
to, or inhere in, the position of the incum bent o f the ultim ate jud icia l office.
For theoretical purposes, though, as we have already indicated, it is convenient to 
assume that every ’ultimate judgm ent’ is exclusively attribu tab le to Iudex  even though 
the judgm ent may in a practical sense incorporate many other decisions, interpretations 
o f law or ’findings’ o f ’fact’ adopted at prior stages in  the adjudication  process.
From  this it follows that every actual or potential judicial act o f Iudex  m ay be treated 
fo r theoretical purposes as constituting the ’defin itive’ statem ent o f the rights and
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duties obtaining between litigants in a given case, certainly in terms of mobilising (or 
potentially mobilising) the coercive apparatuses o f the legal system. It does not follow 
that such a judicial act constitutes a ’defin itive1 statem ent of the ’legally correct’ 
decision, but it is beyond the scope o f the present discussion to consider this
question. It would perhaps suffice to say that ’legal correctness’ and ’legal 
authoritativeness’ are not necessarily co-extensive.
VI.5 Conclusion
The present examination of the ideal type Iudex  seems an appropriate  place to 
conclude this analysis. The perspective o f Iudex  represents, in a sense, the paradigm  
viewpoint for a theoretical consideration o f the ju ral relation. The W eberian
theoretical fram ework presented in chapter II culm inated in an exam ination o f the 
ideal type as a methodological device facilitating social explanation. F ittingly , the 
culm ination of this sociological analysis o f the ju ral relation is the W eberian ideal-type 
construct Iudex. This judicial ideal type has served as a means o f approaching an 
understanding o f the terms upon which significant coercive social forces in society are 
mobilised (to take official action), expressed through the ideative device o f the ju ral 
relation which itself incorporates the linking medium o f the legal norm.
As we discovered, Iudex  may employ an unique array of conceptual techniques for 
conferring legal meaning upon legally relevant ’facts’, but this meaning need not, and 
often does not, take account o f the perceived subjective meaning o f the action o f 
individuals, where the action in question is m aterial to a litigated issue. The causal
dimension o f the role which Iudex  plays in the process o f ’m obilising’ coercive
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institutional forces was also examined in earlier discussion.
Aside from  these questions and more fundam ental was an assumption which has been 
im plicit throughout this essay that our understanding o f the analysis o f the ju ra l 
relation offered by Hohfeld and developed by Kocourek and others is considerably 
advanced by a Weberian sociological approach. The corollary o f this is that the 
explanatory power o f certain distinctly ’H ohfeldian’ aspects of Weber’s sociology o f 
law is heightened when seen, as it were, in the ’light’ o f the Hohfeldian analyses. On 
this basis, it has seemed plausible to argue fo r a syncretism  o f analytical ju risprudence 
and sociology of law.
M ore generally, if this essay has an overarching thesis, it is that the legal relationship 
and specifically the jural relation should be treated as the basic conceptual unit o f 
social thinking and sociological theorising about legal phenomena. The rejection o f the 
legal norm as the prim ary conceptual un it o f legal sociological thought and the 
recognition o f syncretic possibilities fo r sociology and jurisprudence may com bine to 
’liberate’ analytical jurisprudence from  the rigidity  of purely jurid ical conceptions 
which often elevate legal phenomena to an impersonal and even sterile Kelsenian realm  
in which ’purity’ o f reason is seen as a desirable, though surely m isconceived, 
aspiration. The relationality o f hum an social behaviour, as Hohfeld perhaps 
unwittingly taught us, is revealed in the concepts and conceptions ordinarily em ployed 
in legal thinking. Once recognised, this intensely human dimension o f  the 
phenomenon o f law serves only to affirm  the belief that where human social structures 
exist, anything that is uniquely social and uniquely human will surely be m anifested 
therein.
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